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INTRODUCTION
Speed is an asset in computer technology, but not necessarily
in law. The new technologies of the twentieth and twenty-first cen-
turies have inevitably raised new legal questions; all too often, the
response to these new legal challenges is a hastily enacted federal
statute. If the Internet allows children access to pornography, we
enact the Communications Decency Act ("CDA").1 Commercial con-
cerns about cyber-authenticity prompt the Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act ("E-SIGN").2 Are cybersquatters
creating domain name problems? We've got a law for that, too.
3
These are just a few of the quick fixes driven by a perceived need to
address new legal problems arising from new technologies.
4
1. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (Supp. 2000).
3. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp.
2000).
4. Other cyberlaw examples, not discussed in this Article, include the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) and the portion of
the CDA protecting service providers from any liability for defamation, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1994).
A number of problems with the DMCA have already been identified. An amendment has been
introduced to avoid monopolization of the online music industry. See H.R. 2724, 107th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2000). And there is already a growing movement-including at least one member of Con-
gress-to amend the DMCA to allow copying for private use. As presently constructed, the stat-
ute seems to prohibit what would in other contexts be a legitimate use of a copyrighted work. An
online book, for example, cannot be copied so that it can be read from a computer other than the
one onto which it was downloaded; that means that if I purchase a book and download it onto the
computer in my office, it would violate the current DMCA for me to copy it onto my home com-
puter or my laptop so that I could read it in my living room. See Dave Wilson, Programmer Ar-
rested in E-Book Case, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2001, § 3, at 1 (quoting Rep. Rick Boucher, D-Va.,
that it is "inevitable" that Congress will modify the statute to allow individuals to copy for their
own personal use); cf Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 1-2 (2000) (evaluating mixed success of DMCA in new technological con-
texts).
As for the CDA, it was an extreme reaction to a single court imposing liability on an Internet
service provider ("ISP") for defamatory statements posted on one of its bulletin boards. See gen-
erally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995). In fact, the Stratton Oakmont court imposed liability largely because it found that
Prodigy's advertising differentiated it from other ISPs by claiming that it exercised editorial
control. Id. at *3-5. When Prodigy abandoned those policies, another New York trial court found
it immune from liability in another case. See Lunney v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557
310
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But many of these perceived "crises" could actually have
been resolved by previously established law. The common law and
judicial interpretation of existing statutes were working towards a
solution--or had reached one-when the new statute threw a mon-
key wrench into the works. Each of these federal statutes has seri-
ous flaws, some of which arise because the statute short-circuited
the common law's traditional method of dealing with new problems.
The Communications Decency Act has already fallen;5 in its haste,
Congress failed to appreciate the statute's constitutional implica-
tions. This Article argues that both E-SIGN and the Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), while not unconstitu-
tional, are similarly shortsighted. More broadly, I suggest that, at
least in the context of new computer technology, allowing time for
incremental judicial responses is often superior to instant legisla-
tive solutions of a global nature.
When faced with new technology raising novel legal ques-
tions, we have two choices: we can wait for the courts to apply exist-
ing law-and eventually use legislation to fill any gaps that remain
or to make new policy choices--or we can legislate immediately.
Sometimes an immediate legislative response is appropriate, but
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998). Out of fear that judges would impose too much liability for defamation,
however, Congress protected ISPs from any liability, even where the ISP has notice of the defa-
mation and the ability to stop it through reasonable measures. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329, 335 (4th Cir. 1997) (concerning AOL who was alerted to defamatory
messages, but delayed removing them and refused to print retraction; no liability because of §
230); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (rejecting argument that "the
Washington Post would be liable if it had done what AOL did here" because of § 230); Doe v. Am.
Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 2001) (concerning AOL who was alerted to use of chat
room for distribution of child pornography, but refused to warn pornographer or suspend his
service). For criticism of this broad immunity, see, for example, David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL
and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation
on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147 (1997); David Wiener, Negligent Publication of Statements
Posted on Electronic Bulletin Boards: Is There Any Liability Left After Zeran?, 39 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 905 (1999); Steven M. Cordero, Comment, Damnum Absque Injuria: Zeran v. AOL and
Cyberspace Defamation Law, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 775 (1999).
Another example, involving a different sort of new technology, is section 103(b)(1) of the Pat-
ent Act. A recent amendment provides protection in some circumstances to obvious biotechnical
processes when they produce novel and nonobvious subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1) (Supp.
2001). It has been criticized as an attempt to "solve claiming problems by bludgeon." John D.
Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 242 (1998).
Each of these statutes, of course, could be the topic of an entire article. I mention them here
only as additional examples of problematic quick fixes.
5. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In the case of children's access to Internet por-
nography, the common law probably could not have solved the problem in ways that were conge-
nial to the policy choices made by Congress. But had Congress waited, technological advances
might have made the CDA unnecessary.
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often it is not. We should be especially wary of hasty legislative re-
sponses in two circumstances.
First, legislation designed to address questions raised by a
rapidly changing technology is likely to become obsolete equally
quickly. 6 Of course, judicial opinions on the same technology also
become out-of-date. But once Congress has enacted legislation regu-
lating a particular subject, it is unlikely to revisit the issue for
some time; previous enactments can have unintended consequences
or become straitjackets in changed circumstances. Judges are con-
stantly reevaluating doctrine, however, tweaking it to take into ac-
count new factual contexts. Moreover, judicial opinions do not have
the global reach of a congressional enactment: if one judge, or even
a dozen, get it wrong, the geographic reach of the mistake is lim-
ited, and in any event new cases and new judges stand ready to
make corrections.7
As an example, consider the American experience with the
railroads. Like cyber-technology, the railroads stretched the law
and tested its ability to address both new and developing issues.
New questions arose across the legal spectrum, touching everything
from employment law to tort law and from federal-state relations to
anticompetitive behavior. The courts struggled for decades, restruc-
turing and reconsidering the law to accommodate these challenges.
8
Ultimately, the changes in the law were both successful and long-
lasting.
One of the most successful judicial innovations involved rail-
road bankruptcies. Beginning in the 1870s, railroads affected by
economic downturns began to become insolvent. Since there was not
yet any national bankruptcy legislation that would permit reor-
ganization, insolvency might have led to dissolution and sale, dis-
rupting national transportation on a massive scale. The courts,
without congressional assistance, turned to-some would say
"stretched"-the doctrine of equity receiverships to avoid that re-
6. For earlier discussions of this point in related contexts, see, for example, Duncan M.
Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PiTT. L. REV. 1037 (1986); Jane K. Winn,
Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1177 (1998).
7. New technology, then, exacerbates the problems identified more than two decades ago
by Guido Calabresi. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(describing the disadvantages of legislative solutions).
8. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2002). Ely begins by




sult.9 Congress eventually modeled general federal bankruptcy re-
organization legislation on these early judicial experiments. 10
Direct congressional intervention was less successful. Be-
tween the Hepburn Act in 1906 and the Transportation Act in 1920,
Congress passed a series of laws regulating railroad rates. These
Progressive Era laws were designed to keep railroads from using
their monopoly power over domestic transportation to unreasonably
raise rates." Had the railroads maintained that monopoly, the
statutes might have worked well. Unfortunately for Congress, how-
ever, the 1920s saw the rise of the automobile and the trucking in-
dustry, and the consequent demise of the railroads' monopoly.' 2
Hemmed in by a regulatory scheme that did not affect its roadway
competitors, the railroad industry began to suffer, culminating in
massive railroad bankruptcies in the 1970s. It was only those bank-
ruptcies, some fifty years after the Transportation Act, that led
Congress to revisit the question of railroad rate regulation and to
give railroads more power to set their own rates. 13
Thus, in the railroad context, Congress was at its best
when-as in the insolvency context-it waited for common law
processes to bear fruit, using decades of judicial experience to in-
form legislative enactments. The well-motivated but ultimately
harmful legislation in the ratemaking context, on the other hand,
shows the pitfalls of congressional intervention in a fast-changing
technological environment.
A second factor that tends to produce flawed legislation is
the lack of a concrete, defensible interest against the legislation.
Here we might consider the recently invalidated Violence Against
Women Act ("VAWA"). 14 Who could be for violence against women?
This absence of competing interest groups is deeper than simply
that the proposed legislation might affect a diffuse or unorganized
or unmotivated group, and that the group therefore has insufficient
9. See id. at 175-80.
10. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost,
1999 SuP. CT. REV. 393, 402-06. For a similar example of statutory adoption of a successful judi-
cial innovation, see N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1954 AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 69 (photo. reprint 1980)
(1954) (statement of Karl N. Llewellyn).
11. See ELY, supra note 8, at 237-49.
12. See id. at 265-66.
13. See id. at 277-79.




lobbying power. 15 (No one worries about the unrepresented "inter-
ests" of people who commit violence against women.) The problem
with statutes like VAWA is that the true considerations against the
legislation are not susceptible to interest group politics, but rather
fall to a deliberative Congress to consider.16 In the case of VAWA,
for example, the interests on the other side were purely abstract
and theoretical: the avoidance of duplicative legislation and what-
ever federalism concerns one might find legitimate. 17 Moreover, be-
cause public opposition to such a statute is negligible, quick action
is likely to be repaid with public approval, further increasing the
likelihood of drafting mistakes. The lack of opposition also makes it
easier for Congress to spend its time on these "easy" statutes rather
than grappling with more difficult or controversial questions; if the
federal legislature continually reacts to the crisis of the moment, it
may neglect more long-term problems.' 8
Much cyberspace legislation, including the two statutes con-
sidered in this Article, triggers both of these concerns. Technologi-
cal developments make regulation obsolete almost from the moment
of its enactment, highlighting the advantage of the judicial ability
to constantly reconsider and revise doctrine. Moreover, the speed of
the technology exacerbates the crisis mentality of the public and
other interest groups, putting great pressure on Congress to act
now, while the reasons to postpone legislation are highly abstract.
One such interest is avoiding the inevitable disruption caused by
new statutes enacted against a background of developing judicial
doctrine: the courts have been struggling with cyberlaw questions
15. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985)
(explaining how large diffuse groups might have less influence than "discrete and insular minori-
ties").
16. I note that my argument does not depend on whether one attributes the failure to cap-
ture these intangible interests to a collective action problem, as public choice theorists might, or
to a recognition that interest group theory does not always describe the full range of values that
do or should enter into legislative deliberation, as critics of public choice theory might. In either
case, I am simply arguing that where tangible interests are opposed by intangible ones, the re-
sulting legislation is least likely to incorporate a due consideration for the latter.
17. This is not to say that any federalism concerns are necessarily legitimate, but only that
they are the sort of concerns that do not lend themselves to lobbying. Scholars have long debated
whether such interests are adequately represented in Congress even without lobbying. Compare
JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980), Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 215 (2000), and Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954), with John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
18. At least one scholar has suggested that the crisis mentality operating in the environ-
mental law context has reduced the success of our environmental programs. See Jerry L. Ander-
son, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 410 (1995).
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for several years now, and each new statute creates new issues and
new confusion. With legislation governing cyberspace con-
tent-from rules on domain names to rules on copying-there is
also a potential First Amendment concern. Finally, there is the pos-
sible, if ephemeral, harm to the technology itself: an ill-advised
statute might prevent the technology from developing in what
might prove to be fruitful ways. In the case of the ACPA, moreover,
there is an additional factor that increases the pressure on Con-
gress. International harmonization is often used as a justification
for laws regulating the global Internet, and multinational compa-
nies are eager to have Congress achieve harmonization. Since many
of the countries that are legislating in these technological areas are
civil law, rather than common law, jurisdictions, there is a further
bias against judicial problem-solving.
Congress may well conclude, independent of public senti-
ment, that the benefits of the statute outweigh the harms to intan-
gible interests. There may also be circumstances in which the costs
of waiting through the long common law development process are
greater than the risks arising from possible congressional errors.
One example of such a circumstance is if the adoption of a stan-
dard-any standard-is more important than its particular content
(such as determining which side of the road to drive on). However,
we should be somewhat suspicious of quick congressional action
where the two concerns identified in this Article are present. And,
in fact, this Article suggests that recent cyberspace legislation justi-
fies the suspicion.
This is not to suggest that cyberspace should remain unregu-
lated. Scholars debating cyberspace regulation have, by and large,
fallen into three groups. The first group, the cyber-anarchists, deny
that traditional forms of law should play any role at all, suggesting
instead that community norms and technological limits should be
the only regulators. 19 A second group, the cyber-exceptionalists, re-
19. See, e.g., John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 207, 208, 235 (1997); Andy Johnson-Laird, The Anatomy of the Internet Meets the Body
of the Law, 22 UNIV. DAYTON L. REV. 465, 467 (1997) (concluding that "trying to legislate the
Internet is a great task that is potentially impossible technically"); David R. Johnson & David
Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996);
David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a New Theory
of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (1998); see
also James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66
U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997) ("For a long time, the Internet's enthusiasts have believed that it
would be largely immune from state regulation."). Lawrence Lessig also notes that cyber-




ject anarchy but nevertheless deny that traditional legal tools are
adequate to regulate cyberspace; they urge instead the creation of a
separate legal regime for cyberspace. Their model seems to suggest
cyberspace either as a kind of separate sovereign (as the states and
the federal. government are separate sovereigns) or the subject of an
independent body of law. 20 A third group complains that both the
cyber-anarchists and the cyber-exceptionalists exaggerate the nov-
elty of the legal questions raised by the new technologies. Frank
Easterbrook argues, for example, that developing specialized doc-
trines to deal with the legal problems of cyberspace is analogous to
creating a "Law of the Horse." He suggests instead that we should
"[d]evelop a sound law of intellectual property, then apply it to
computer networks."
21
I believe that the truth lies somewhere in between. The cy-
ber-anarchists and cyber-exceptionalists have overstated the nov-
elty of cyberspace, but Easterbrook and his fellows have undestated
it. We cannot simply plug the factual context of the Internet into
existing law and expect it to produce coherent answers, but neither
do we need to create an entirely new regime to govern cyberspace.
So how should we regulate this hybrid creature of familiar legal
questions in a strikingly new context? Lawrence Lessig was the
first-but certainly not the last-to argue that the best way to deal
with legal questions arising from the Internet is to rely on the
common law process and other traditional legal tools. 22
20. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE, at ix (2000) ("M]any of the intellectual property rules and practices
that evolved in the world of physical artifacts do not work well in the digital environment."); Dan
L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (1996) [hereinafter Burk, Fed-
eralism]; Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
943, 943-47 (1998); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 995 (1994); Henry Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Communities,
38 VILL. L. REV. 349, 350 (1993); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-making in
Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 912 (1996). Mark Lemley draws a similar distinction between
cyber-anarchists and those who would instead erect "new governmental structures" for cyber-
space. Mark Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257,
1260 n.8 (1998).
21. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
208; see also Richard A. Epstein, Before Cyberspace: Legal Transitions in Property Rights Re-
gimes, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1998) ("[J]nnovations of technology neither preclude nor
require fundamental transformations in the legal regime that governs them.") [hereinafter Ep-
stein, Before Cyberspace]; Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment:
The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1047 (2000); Charles
Fried, Perfect Freedom or Perfect Control?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 606, 614-15 (2000).
22. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744-45 (1995); see also
Epstein, Before Cyberspace, supra note 21, at 1154; Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65
316 [Vol. 55:309
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This Article uses existing case law to argue in favor of the
common law process, in which I include both judge-made common
law and judicial interpretation of existing statutes. I suggest in
particular that judicial adaptations are likely to be more successful
than federal legislative solutions. Three years after Lessig urged
that we rely on the common law, Mark Lemley commented that the
"hundreds of reported decisions" were "arguably doing a pretty good
job of adapting existing law to the new and uncertain circumstances
of the Net."23 Three years later, we have thousands of cases and an
overlay of several new federal statutes.
Following the path of Lessig and Lemley, I suggest in this
Article that judicial responses-including both common law devel-
opment and the judicial interpretation of existing statutes-to the
novel questions posed by the Internet have been adequate to the
task, and that the newest statutes are at best unnecessary and at
worst shortsighted. These instant legislative solutions offer the
promise of speed, but the speed is often expended careening around
blind corners. By contrast, the common law method offers the lux-
ury of time and successive experience, while still dealing with the
concrete problems posed by the new technology.
This Article illustrates the dangers of over-hasty congres-
sional action by focusing on illustrative federal responses to cyber-
law dilemmas. Parts I and II examine two recent federal enact-
ments that are at best useless and at worst harmful in dealing with
the problems that prompted them. Part III offers a cyberspace
common law success story: in the absence of clarifying legislation,
state and federal courts have been struggling with the question of
personal jurisdiction in the context of the Internet, and, after some
early missteps, seem to be approaching a rational solution.
I. LOST IN CYBERSPACE: THE ACPA
The Internet brought with it a new form of piracy, quickly
labeled "cybersquatting" or "cyber-piracy." Cybersquatting can oc-
cur when an individual or company registers as a second-level do-
main name either a well-known trademark or a typographical
U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1200-01 (1998); Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persis-
tent Fallacies, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1998); Lemley, supra note 20. Lessig offers a
somewhat different vision of the interaction between law and cyberspace in his recent book, but
it too rejects both cyber-anarchy and the notion that cyberlaw is no different from any other law.
See generally LESSIG, supra note 19.
23. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1294. Lemley's article did not discuss the cases.
2002]
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variation on that trademark. 24 (A second-level domain name is what
immediately precedes the last "dot": for example, "vanderbilt" in the
domain name "www.vanderbilt.edu.") The cyber-pirate often then
tries to sell the domain name to the trademark owner. Sometimes
the cyber-pirate tries instead to divert the trademark owner's
would-be customers to his or her own web site in the hopes of mak-
ing a profit. Yet sometimes the registrant has a legitimate reason
for registering the name, which makes defining cybersquatting dif-
ficult. Enterprising individuals have registered the names of celeb-
rities ("juliaroberts.com" 25), businesses ("panavision.com" 26), and
organizations ("plannedparenthood.com" 27), as well as such variants
as "sportillustrated.com" 28 and "lucentsucks.com. ''29
To protect trademark owners from this new activity, Con-
gress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
("ACPA"), which took effect in November 1999. The ACPA ad-
dresses the problem by creating a cause of action by a trademark
owner against anyone who "registers, traffics in, or uses" a mark as
a domain name with "a bad faith intent to profit from" the mark.
The statute requires that the trademark be either distinctive or fa-
mous, and that the domain name be identical, confusingly similar
to, or-in the case of a famous mark-dilutive of the mark. Under
the ACPA, bad faith is determined by looking to a nonexhaustive
list of nine factors that attempt to measure the legitimacy of the
registrant's claim to the name and any evidence that the registrant
has tried to profit from the name.
The ACPA is a superficially attractive statute. It was en-
acted quickly with a great deal of popular support, since it is hard
24. For those who are unfamiliar with the worldwide web and how it works, a recent case
contains an excellent description. Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 492-93 (2d
Cir. 2000); see also Michael V. LiRocchi et al., Trademarks and Internet Domain Names in the
Digital Millennium, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 377, 378-89 (1999-2000).
25. See P. Landon Moreland & Colby B. Springer, Celebrity Domain Names: ICANN Arbi-
tration Pitfalls and Pragmatic Advice, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 385, 387-
89 (2001) (discussing Julia Fiona Roberts v. Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210 (May 29,
2000)).
26. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Panavi-
sion").
27. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1432
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Planned Parenthood").
28. See Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710 n.2
(E.D. Pa. 2000).
29. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 529 (E.D. Va. 2000). Not
all of the examples given in text are fairly characterized as cybersquatting. Part of the difficulty




to be in favor of cyber-piracy. But like several other recent public
relations enactments by Congress, 30 it was also redundant insofar
as it dealt with a problem already sufficiently addressed by other
statutes, and confusingly drafted because of the pressure of the per-
ceived "crisis." With the possible exception of overcoming occasional
jurisdictional problems-an issue I address later 3'-longstanding
trademark infringement law and the relatively new Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) could, and in many cases did, pro-
duce identical results in all cases subject to the ACPA. But Con-
gress did not care that trademark law was developing solutions to
cybersquatting; instead, it jumped in prematurely, making cyber-
law now more, rather than less, complicated and confused.
In Part I.A, I examine cases against cybersquatters under
both existing law and the new ACPA in order to demonstrate that
the ACPA was unnecessary at best. But as might be expected from
a statute drafted hastily with great public and industry support, its
problems go beyond mere redundancy. In Part I.B, I examine the
harm that the ACPA is causing to the intangible interests that re-
mained largely unrepresented in Congress's attack on the problem.
Finally, beyond these flaws, the ACPA is also chasing technological
and other innovations. For that reason, it is no better at dealing
with the newest problems than were the prior statutes, and has al-
ready been eclipsed by other remedies such as a new dispute resolu-
tion procedure. I consider these problems in Part I.C. In Part I.D, I
return to the theme of this Article by examining Congress's atti-
tude, in passing the ACPA, toward the intangible concerns I have
identified.
30. Examples of redundant federal statutes include the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
was struck down in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995), and the Violence Against
Women Act, which was struck down in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000). Ex-
amples of popular but constitutionally problematic (and possibly unnecessary) federal statutes
include the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was struck down in City ofBoerne v. Flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997), and portions of both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
which was struck down in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 62 (2000), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which was struck down in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356, 356 (2001). One hasty and poorly drafted statute, the Supplemental Jurisdiction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (1994), has not yet been struck down but is creating interpretive difficulties. Com-
pare In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 529 U.S.
333 (2000), and Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1996),
with Trimble v. ASARCO, Inc., 232 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2000), Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999), and Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir.
1998). For a critique of Congress's handiwork on similar grounds, see Neal Devins, Congress as
Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435
(2001).
31. See infra Part I.A.6.
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A. The ACPA Was Unnecessary
1. Introduction
Perhaps the clearest evidence that courts were perfectly ca-
pable of responding to cybersquatting without the ACPA is the case
of Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market.32 Sportsman's Market, a
catalog business selling aviation equipment, tools, and home acces-
sories, had been using the mark "Sporty's" since the 1960s and had
registered it in 1985. 33 In 1995, a businessman who received Sports-
man's catalogs decided to enter the aviation catalog business
himself and began a company that registered the name "spor-
tys.com." 34 That company later sold the name to Sporty's Farm, a
wholly-owned subsidiary which grows and sells Christmas trees. 35
When Sporty's Farm brought a federal declaratory judgment action
against Sportsman's Market seeking the right to continue using the
name, Sportsman's Market counterclaimed for trademark infringe-
ment and trademark dilution. 36 The ACPA had not yet been en-
acted.
The district court ruled in favor of Sportsman's Market on
the trademark dilution count, finding that the mark was-as re-
quired under the FTDA-both famous and distinctive, and that the
registration of sportys.com diluted the mark because it "compro-
mise[d] Sportsman's Market's ability to identify and distinguish its
goods on the Internet. '" 37 The court ordered Sporty's Farm to relin-
quish the domain name, which Sportsman's Market subsequently
acquired. But the court refused to grant either damages or attor-
neys' fees because Sporty's Farm's conduct was not "willful" under
the FTDA.
Both parties appealed to the Second Circuit. Judge Calabresi
eventually issued a unanimous opinion for a three-judge panel, af-
firming both of the district court's substantive rulings: Sportsman's
Market was entitled to the domain name, but it was not entitled to
damages or attorneys' fees. What makes Judge Calabresi's opinion
notable is that it applies the newly enacted ACPA rather than the
32. 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
33. Id. at 494.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The counterclaim also included a state unfair competition claim, irrelevant for my
purposes.
37. Id. at 495.
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FTDA.38 Nevertheless, it found nothing to disturb in the trial
judge's FTDA ruling. At least in this case, everything that the
ACPA accomplished could be done-indeed, had been done-under
the FTDA.
Sporty's Farm provides a particularly cogent example of the
overlap between the FTDA and the ACPA, but it is not alone. In the
six years since the passage of the FTDA, courts have used it repeat-
edly in cybersquatting cases, by and large reaching intuitively cor-
rect results--or at least results that are unlikely to differ markedly
from those produced by the ACPA. An examination of how the
courts have done so illustrates the strength of the common law
method: the courts have applied existing statutes and doctrines to
new problems, one case at a time, and in doing so have constructed
a jurisprudence that looks remarkably like the congressional en-
actment without suffering from its flaws.
There are five key differences between the FTDA and the
ACPA, but for all but one of these differences the courts have inter-
preted the FTDA in a way that presaged the ACPA.3 9 First, trade-
mark dilution and cybersquatting-the targets of the respective
statutes-are not identical: dilution as defined by the FTDA is the
commercial use of a trademark in a way that harms its reputational
value, while cybersquatting as defined by the ACPA is the bad faith
registration of a trademark as a domain name. Second, in order to
prevail under the FTDA, a trademark owner must show that its
mark is both famous and distinctive; the ACPA requires only that it
be either famous or distinctive. Third, the ACPA incorporates a
standard of "bad faith intent to profit" for any recovery, even in-
junctive relief, while the FTDA has no state-of-mind prerequisite
for injunctive relief but requires "willfulness" before a court can
award damages, costs, or attorneys' fees. Fourth, the FTDA pro-
vides for ordinary injunctive relief as the standard remedy, while
the ACPA authorizes courts to order the transfer of the domain
name from the defendant to the plaintiff.40 Finally, the ACPA ex-
38. Id. at 496. The timing of the case is particularly interesting. After holding the case for
almost a year after oral argument, the court issued its opinion two months after the effective
date of the new statute.
39. The FTDA was itself enacted to fill gaps in existing trademark infringement law. In
some cases, relief under the FTDA and federal trademark infringement law will overlap. In other
cases, a defendant might be liable only for dilution or only for infringement. The elements of the
ACPA are closer to dilution than to infringement, and thus I will focus on comparisons between
the ACPA and the FTDA, but I will also note in passing the circumstances under which the
ACPA duplicates remedies available under the Lanham Act for trademark infringement.
40. The ACPA (but not the FTDA) also provides for statutory damages at the election of the
trademark owner. Since most trademark owners are primarily interested in obtaining the do-
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plicitly allows in rem suits against the domain name itself, but only
if the registrant of the name either cannot be located or is not sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction. I deal with each of these differences
in turn.
2. Commercial Dilution Versus Bad Faith Registration
The poster child for the crusade against cybersquatting is
Dennis Toeppen. An enterprising netizen, Toeppen was an early
registrant of over 100 domain names, including some incorporating
the trademarks of such companies as Delta Airlines, Neiman Mar-
cus, and Eddie Bauer. But Toeppen's lasting claim to fame arose
from his registration of the names "panavision.com" and
"panaflex.com." His web page for panavision.com displayed photo-
graphs of the city of Pana, Illinois; his web page for panaflex.com
displayed the word "Hello." Not surprisingly, Panavision (which
owns registered trademarks for both Panavision and Panaflex) sued
Toeppen under the FTDA in 1996. Both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the novelty of Panavi-
main name, cases seeking statutory damages are rare. See P. Wayne Hale, Note, The Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act & Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 205, 223 n.127 (2001) (noting the paucity of cases).
Moreover, as a deterrent to cybersquatters, the provision for statutory damages does not
seem to work. John Zuccarini, for example, has registered thousands of domain names consisting
of deliberate misspellings of individual, corporate, and organizational names. Elecs. Boutique
Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1710 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 2000). When some-
one mistakenly types one of Zuccarini's misspellings, she becomes " 'mousetrapped' in a barrage
of advertising windows" from which she cannot escape without clicking through the advertise-
ments. Id. at 1708. Each "click" nets Zuccarini between ten and twenty-five cents, and he has
conceded that he earns between $800,000 and $1,000,000 annually from these advertisements.
Id. at 1708, 1712. He has not been deterred by the initiation of several separate lawsuits. See,
e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001); Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp., 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705; Dennis Maxim, Inc. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-2104 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,
2000), cited in Elecs. Boutique Holding Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. CIV. A. 00-4055, 2001 WL 83388,
at *8 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001); see also Elecs. Boutique Holding Corp., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1712-13 (describing Zuccarini's registration of new domain names after the initiation of sev-
eral lawsuits and after he had been enjoined from using previously registered domain names).
What may deter cybersquatters is the approach the FTC has recently taken with regard to Zuc-
carini: they have filed an enforcement suit against him for unfair and deceptive practices, and
have obtained a preliminary injunction against him. See Trade Regulation-Deceptive Practices:
FTC Launches Enforcement Suit Against Purported Cyberscammer, 70 U.S.L.W. 2211 (Sept. 25,
2001) (discussing FTC v. Zuccarini). Finally, since most large-scale cybersquatters registered
their domain names before widespread commercial use of the Internet, and before courts began
imposing liability at all, any deterrent value comes too late. See Cybersquatting and Consumer
Protection: Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 73-79 (1999) (statements of Professors Jessica Litman and Michael
Froomkin). For these reasons, I do not discuss this provision of the ACPA, believing that it is a
minor part of the statute, which in any case could easily have been added to the FTDA instead.
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sion's claim under the FTDA, but neither court had any difficulty
ruling in favor of Panavision.
The most difficult question for the Court of Appeals was
whether Toeppen's use of the trademark was "commercial" within
the meaning of the FTDA. 41 Some earlier precedent had held that
mere registration of a domain name was not a commercial use un-
der the act.42 But the court reasoned that Toeppen was using the
name commercially: although he was not using it to sell products,
he was hoping to make money from it by selling the name back to
Panavision. The ACPA incorporates this insight by making both
attempts to sell the name to the mark owner and registration of
multiple trademarked domain names relevant to the determination
of bad faith. The Panavision court did not need the assistance of the
ACPA, however, to perceive that Toeppen was making a commercial
use of the name-nor have numerous other courts before and
since. 43 One need not even offer to sell the domain name to come
within the ambit of the FTDA: in Planned Parenthood Federation of
America v. Bucci,44 the court held that an anti-abortion web site
41. The Court also addressed the difficult question of personal jurisdiction, which I do not
consider in this section. See infra Parts I.A.6, III.
42. In fact, of the three cases cited by the Court of Appeals for this proposition, Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998), one was the district court's
ruling below, which ultimately found jurisdiction on the ground that Toeppen did more than
merely register the name. The other two were suits against the domain-name registration ser-
vice, NSI, which courts have consistently refused to hold liable. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts &
Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. CV 97-6394-LEWMCX, 1997 WL 810472 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (C.D. Cal.
1997). The ACPA explicitly exempts NSI and its successors from liability. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(2)(D)(ii) (Supp. 2000).
Some commentators have suggested that the ACPA was necessary in order to penalize the
mere registration of domain names by cybersquatters. See, e.g., LiRocchi et al., supra note 24, at
395-97; Neil L. Martin, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Empowering Trade-
mark Owners but Not the Last Word on Domain Name Disputes, 25 J. CORP. L. 591, 603-04
(2000); Jason H. Kaplan, Comment, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Will It End
the Reign of the Cybersquatter?, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 43, 48-50 (2000).
As the text makes clear, I argue that courts were quite capable of remedying registration by
cybersquatters even before the enactment of the ACPA. At least one very early commentator
predicted that result. See Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the
Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 69 (Apr. 10, 1995) (stating that "the
established law of trademarks appears admirably suited" to resolving domain name disputes), at
http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/rlil/burk.html.
43. See, e.g., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 184 n.6 (W.D.N.Y.
2000) (declining explicitly to reach question of liability under newly enacted ACPA); Jews for
Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc., v. Tele-Tech Co.,
977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D.
Ill. 1996)
44. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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owner who used the domain name "plannedparenthood.com" was
using the mark commercially because, among other things, his "ac-
tions are designed to, and do, harm plaintiff commercially." 45 Other
courts have found trademark infringement in similar circum-
stances. One court has held that trademark infringement "does not
require that Defendant actually caused goods or services to be
placed into the stream of commerce," because the Lanham Act en-
compasses "the dissemination of information, including purely ideo-
logical information."46 Thus neither the FTDA requirement that the
mark be used commercially, nor the requirement under infringe-
ment law that the mark be used commercially and "in connection
with the sale or offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods and services," 47 serves as an obstacle to finding liability in
cybersquatting cases.
The Ninth Circuit also had to decide whether Toeppen's use
of the trademark as a domain name constituted dilution. Again, the
court had little trouble concluding that Toeppen's conduct diluted
the Panavision mark even though it did not fit the traditional defi-
nitions of tarnishment or blurring.48 The existence of Toeppen's web
sites both "put[ I Panavision's name and reputation at his mercy,"
49
and diminished Panavision's ability to use its mark to lead custom-
ers to its site. Customers looking for Panavision might have to wade
through the hundreds of web sites likely to be produced by a search
engine, or might become frustrated with Panavision-and discour-
aged from further searching-if panavision.com did not lead them
to Panavision's home page. In short, Toeppen's use of the Panavi-
45. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435; see also OBH, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 186, 192 (holding
that use of domain name "constitutes a 'use in commerce' " under infringement statute and
FTDA because it "affects [the trademark owners'] ability to offer their services in commerce" and
because it is "designed to, and doles], harm [the trademark owners] commercially").
Planned Parenthood raises a separate problem regarding web sites that are designed to criti-
cize trademark owners. I deal with this question later, see infra Part I.B, but note here only that
Planned Parenthood may be different both because it involved registration of the mark itself
rather than a variant on it (such as "lucentsucks.com") and because the domain name was at-
tached to a web site that fostered rather than diminished the consumer's initial confusion.
46. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, No. CIV. A. 99-1336-A,
2000 WL 943353, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2000).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
48. Tarnishment links the mark to inferior or offensive products or services. Blurring occurs
when the defendant's use of the mark creates the possibility that the mark will lose its quality as
a unique identifier. That is why the Xerox Corporation works so hard to make sure that consum-
ers understand that a "Xerox copy" is not the equivalent of a xerographic copy but can come only
from a machine made by Xerox. But see Will Shortz, Crossword, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2001, at E23
(41 down, Clue: "copied"; Answer: "xeroxed").
49. Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998).
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sion marks as domain names lessened Panavision's capacity to
identify itself and its products on the web. Other courts have
reached similar conclusions under the FTDA.50 One court has held
that "internet cyberpiracy constitutes per se trademark dilution." 51
In addition, many courts have found cybersquatting to be trade-
mark infringement as well as (or instead of) trademark dilution. 52
Indeed, in one case a court found that the use of the plaintiffs mark
("Seawind" for a kit-built amphibious airplane) was not infringed by
the defendant's physical products (a "Seawind Builders Newsletter"
and a plane called a "Turbine Seawind," built from plaintiffs kit
with the addition of a turbine engine), but was infringed by the
mere use of the plaintiffs mark in defendant's domain name ("seaw-
ind.net").5 3
As the Panavision case illustrates, a dilution action can be
strong medicine. Indeed, a number of commentators have criticized
the FTDA for overprotecting trademarks from noncompeting uses.
54
50. See, e.g., OBH, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 176; N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Account-
ants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 343-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Jews for Jesus v.
Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 294-313 (D.N.J. 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc.,
No. Civ. A 97-734A, 1998 WL 724000, at *5-10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998); see also Northland Ins.
Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1124-25 (D. Minn. 2000) (finding no violation of either
FTDA or ACPA, on grounds that site designed to air complaints about company was neither
"commercial" for FTDA purposes nor established with "bad faith intent to profit" for ACPA pur-
poses).
51. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (E.D. Va. 2000),
afd sub nom. Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001).
52. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 92-104 (2d Cir.
2001) (preliminary injunction; infringement but not dilution); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.
W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1061-67 (9th Cir. 1999) (preliminary injunction); OBH,
Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 191-94; Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int'l, Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1114-
15 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (TRO); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Nexus Energy Software, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 436,
437-40 (D. Mass. 1999) (preliminary injunction); Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading
Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 502-05 (E.D. Va. 1999) (infringement but not dilution);
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1004-05 (D. Minn. 1998); Jews for Je-
sus, 993 F. Supp. at 305-08; Playboy Enters., Inc., 1998 WL 724000, at *5-8; Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1220-22 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (preliminary injunction);
Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1075-82 (N.D. Iowa
1997); Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 739-43 (E.D. Va. 1997); Lozano Enters. v. La
Opinion Publ'g Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1764, 1767-70 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Comp Exam'r
Agency, Inc. v. Juris, Inc., No. 96-0213-WMB(CTX), 1996 WL 376600, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26,
1996).
53. SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550-53 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
54. Many commentators have criticized the FTDA for straying from the consumer-based
reasons underlying trademark protection and for threatening to create "rights in gross" in
trademarked words. See, e.g., Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in Federal
Dilution Legislation, Part 11, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 5, 5-12 (2000); Robert N.
Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protec-
tion, 58 U. PiTT. L. REV. 789, 831-66 (1997); Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protec-
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At least in the context of domain name disputes, however, the
courts have been quite careful to limit the definition of dilution to
cybersquatting and related acts. Another Ninth Circuit case, Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 55 provides an illuminating contrast to
Panavision. The plaintiff sold office products under the trade-
marked names "Avery" and "Dennison," and maintained web sites
at "avery.com" and "averydennison.com." The defendant, Sumpton,
was a provider of vanity e-mail addresses, leasing e-mail addresses
to individuals that incorporated their last names, their careers,
their hobbies, and so on.56 He had registered thousands of domain
names for this purpose, including both "avery.net" and "denni-
son.net." He did so because both Avery and Dennison are relatively
common last names. He never tried to sell either name to Avery
Dennison. Although the district court had granted summary judg-
ment for Avery Dennison, the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered
the lower court to grant summary judgment to Sumpton. The Court
of Appeals held that Sumpton was not using the trademarks com-
mercially: although he was making money from his registration of
both domain names, he was not "capitalizing on [their] trademark
status."5 7 Thus, although what Sumpton did would ordinarily be
considered "commercial," the court limited the FTDA to protect le-
gitimate uses of words that happened to be trademarked.
In Avery Dennison Corp. and Panavision, then, the court
struck a careful balance: preventing cybersquatting but allowing
tion for "Famous" Trademarks: Anti-Competitive "Monopoly" or Earned "Property" Right?, 47
FLA. L. REV. 653, 682-739 (1995); Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-By-Blurring: A Theory
Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1858-75 (2000);
see also Jennifer Golinveaux, What's In a Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark Dilu-
tion?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641, 671 (1999) (criticizing use of FTDA in domain name cases). A recent
article defends dilution law as a necessary complement of infringement law. See Gerard N.
Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 949, 954 (2001).
I do not take sides in the debate over whether the FTDA is good public policy (or good trade-
mark theory), but only suggest that the ACPA does not differ from it sufficiently to justify the
latter's enactment. For general critiques of the overall trend of expanding trademark protection,
including in the context of domain names, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, The
Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (2000). To the extent that the critics are right about the FTDA, the
ACPA is not only unnecessary, but also built on a bad foundation.
55. 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 872. For example, individuals might be able to lease such names as suz-
anna@sherry.net, sherry@lawprofessor.net, paul@oenophile.net, rosie@ratto.net, etc.
57. Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 880. The court also found that Avery Dennison's fame
within a limited market was insufficient to satisfy the "famousness" element of the FTDA. See id.
at 874-77. The question of famousness is discussed infra Part I.A.3.
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registration of trademarked domain names for other legitimate rea-
sons. In Avery Dennison Corp., the court interpreted "commercial"
to strike this balance. As we will see in the next section of this Arti-
cle, courts have also relied on other aspects of the FTDA to strike at
cybersquatters without endangering legitimate domain name regis-
trations.58
3. Famousness and Distinctiveness
To prevail on a claim of trademark dilution under the FTDA,
the plaintiff must show that its mark is famous and that the defen-
dant's use dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark.5 9 The FTDA pro-
vides that fame and distinctiveness may be determined by consider-
ing a nonexhaustive list of eight factors. 60 Unlike trademark in-
fringement, which applies only to confusing uses of the mark, the
FTDA prevents all commercial uses of the mark. Thus, only the use
of "Nike" on shoes is likely to be trademark infringement, but Nike
sodas, cars, and television sets all clearly violate the FTDA. Be-
cause of its breadth, the FTDA is meant to apply only to truly fa-
mous marks in order to preserve the supply of available words.
Both the legislative history and many cases interpreting the FTDA
support this narrow definition of famousness. 61
58. One commentator criticizes the ACPA for potentially overprotecting trademarks, sug-
gesting that under the ACPA a court might have granted Avery Dennison the relief it sought. See
Gregory B. Blasbalg, Note, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark Holders Now Have New Ways
to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 563, 583-85 (2000). As I
suggest in text, I think that unlikely; courts have tended to import the earlier FTDA limits into
the ACPA. Nevertheless, the possibility illustrates one of the dangers of enacting an unnecessary
statute such as the ACPA. See infra Part l.B.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
60. The factors to be considered are:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the dura-
tion and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with
which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark
is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark
is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
§ 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H).
61. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, 212 F.3d 157, 171
(3d Cir. 2000) (Barry, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history); Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d
at 874-76; I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (ist Cir. 1998); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b (1995) (detailing pre-FTDA history of
state causes of action for trademark dilution).
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As an abstract matter, then, the FTDA might seem to be un-
available in many cases of cybersquatting. 62 While "nike.com" and
"panavision.com" might satisfy the famousness component of the
FTDA, names that are recognized only within an industry or within
a local geographic area might not. Nevertheless, in the context of
domain name disputes, courts have frequently found such local or
industry-limited marks to be famous for purposes of the FTDA. Ex-
amples of such limited-fame marks include "Teletech" for "the larg-
est provider of primarily inbound integrated telephone and Internet
customer care worldwide"63 and "La Opinion" for "the largest circu-
lation stand-alone Spanish language newspaper in the United
States."
64
The danger, of course, is that in an attempt to reach cyber-
squatting, courts might construe famousness so broadly as to un-
dermine the intent to limit the applicability of the FTDA. 65 How-
ever, most courts have extended the FTDA to limited-fame marks
only where the junior user (including a domain name registrant)
has no plausible claim to the use of the mark-that is, where the
junior user's most likely motivation was to benefit from the public
recognition of the mark. There is nothing in the FTDA that explic-
itly requires this result, and evaluating the junior user's claim to
the mark-since it does not fall among the FTDA's eight listed fac-
tors-would not seem particularly relevant to a determination of
famousness. 66 Nevertheless, an examination of actual FTDA cases
62. Some commentators argue that problems with the "famousness" requirement of the
FTDA made the ACPA necessary. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 42; Marc Lorelli, Note, How
Trademark Litigation over Internet Domain Names Will Change After Section 43(d) of the
Lanham Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 97, 103-04 (2000); Danielle Weinberg Swartz, Comment,
The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1487, 1519 (1998). As I make clear in the text, I believe that courts had solved this problem even
before the enactment of the ACPA.
63. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1409 (C.D.
Cal. 1997).
64. Lozano Enters. v. La Opinion Publ'g Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1764, 1766 (C.D. Cal.
1997); see also Online Partners.Com, Inc. v. Atlanticnet Media Corp., No. Civ. A. C98-41462000,
2000 WL 101242, at *6-10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000) (holding that fame within gay community
sufficient for FTDA claim); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs.,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that fame within community of certified
public accountants in New York state sufficient for FTDA claim).
65. For a student note warning of such a possibility, and concluding that the FTDA is there-
fore not an appropriate vehicle for remedying cybersquatting, see John D. Mercer, Note, Cyber-
squatting: Blackmail on the Information Superhighway, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 290, 295-301
(2000).
66. The intent of the alleged infringer is generally considered relevant to the question of
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement cases, but the FTDA deliberately eliminates
any requirement of likelihood of confusion. It is possible, however, that in the dilution context
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strongly suggests that a court's determination of famousness, for
less than universally famous marks like Nike, is influenced by the
court's view of the legitimacy of the junior user's motives.
For example, in Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., a court
found that "Star Markets" was not sufficiently famous to satisfy the
FTDA.6 7 The name apparently had considerable name recognition
and famousness in Hawaii, and probably would have met the stan-
dards applied in the Teletech and La Opinion cases. But Texaco had
slowly been converting its mainland convenience stores (associated
with its gasoline stations) to "Star Mart" in order to resonate with
its "Star-T" logo. 68 Texaco thus had a strong claim that it was not
trading on Star Markets' name recognition or goodwill, and the
court rejected Star Markets' FTDA claim. On the other hand, in
WAWA Inc. v. Haaf, the court found (with no discussion) that the
use of WAWA for convenience stores in a five-state area was suffi-
ciently famous to satisfy the FTDA, and thus enjoined defendant
Haafs use of the name HAHA for a competing convenience store.
69
Although Haaf claimed that he called his market "HAHA" because
he and his wife intended to own it jointly, no partnership or other
documents had been prepared, and he was the sole owner of the
store and the sole registrant of the fictitious name. It is easy to con-
clude that Haafs use of a name similar to WAWA had no legitimate
purpose, but instead was deliberately designed to benefit from
WAWA's mark.
Courts have reached similarly divergent results under the
FTDA as applied to domain name disputes. In Avery Dennison
Corp., for example-in which, as discussed earlier, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that Sumpton's registration of avery.net and denni-
son.net for vanity e-mail addresses was not a commercial use-the
court also held that neither "Avery" nor "Dennison" was sufficiently
famous to warrant FTDA protection. 70 But another court found
"NYSSCPA" (for New York State Society of Certified Public Ac-
countants) famous in the context of its use on a web site by an ac-
courts are using intent as indirect evidence of famousness: the amount of the defendant's ex-
pected gain is related to the famousness of the mark.
67. 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1033-37 (D. Haw. 1996).
68. Id. at 1031. How many readers remember, "Trust your car to the man who wears the
star"?
69. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1631-33 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
70. 189 F.3d 868, 874-79 (9th Cir. 1999).
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countant placement firm seeking to capitalize on name recognition
within the niche market of accountants in New York. 7'
While no court has explicitly held that the junior user's mo-
tivation is relevant to the question of famousness, a fair reading of
the cases suggests that such an analysis explains the pattern of dif-
ferent holdings in factually similar cases. 72 Moreover, several courts
have noted that fame in a "niche" market is more likely to support
an FTDA claim in cases in which the two users of the mark are di-
rect competitors. 73 Distinguishing between uses depending on the
competitive status of the user supports the notion that the FTDA is
being interpreted to take into account the junior user's motives: a
competitor who uses a protected mark (other than a truly famous
mark such as Nike) is more likely to be trying to gain a competitive
advantage than is a noncompetitor who uses the mark.
And except for its relevance in revealing the defendant's mo-
tives in using the mark, the fact that the plaintiff and defendant
are competitors is actually inconsistent with the purposes of the
FTDA, as several courts have noted. 74 The FTDA was designed to
prevent the appearance of Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak
pianos. Such uses would not involve consumer confusion, and there-
fore would not fall under traditional trademark infringement
analysis. The statute was not meant "as mere fallback protection
for trademark owners unable to prove trademark infringement"75
because of a lack of sufficient confusion, but rather as a remedy for
71. N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
331, 344-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
72. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see, for example, TCPIP Holding Co. v.
Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 88 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding "The Children's Place" for
clothing store was neither famous nor distinctive in context of suit against developer of web
portal for kids' web sites who used "thechildrensplace.com"); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing,
Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126 (D. Mass. 1999), afj'd, 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (find-
ing "Clue" was not famous in context of use by Internet company and that there was no evidence
that it intended to capitalize on name of board game).
73. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sporting News, 212 F.3d 157, 164-
65 (3d Cir. 2000); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir.
1999); id. (providing authorities); see also S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 43 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5605 (suggesting that local fame sufficient under FTDA if both users are in
same local area); cf. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating
that likelihood of dilution of minimally distinctive mark is easier to show if products are compet-
ing); Hasbro, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 133, aflfd, 232 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that use of
another's trademark as a domain name is dilution only where it is "deceptive or intentional").
74. See, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48-50 (1st Cir. 1998); Wash-
ington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 503-04 (E.D. Va.
1999).
75. I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 48; see also Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 218-19 (citing
FDTA legislative history).
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a specific harm outside the purview of infringement. This narrow
purpose belies any interpretation that would make relief more
available to competitors than to noncompetitors. 76 Thus, to the ex-
tent that the owner of a marginally famous mark is more likely to
succeed in an FTDA suit against a direct competitor than against a
noncompetitor, the cases can best be explained by positing that a
direct competitor is more likely than a noncompetitor to have had
nefarious motives for choosing the mark.
This accommodation between the extent of the mark's fame
and the legitimacy of the junior user's claim presages the require-
ments of the ACPA. While the ACPA provides protection to marks
that are either famous or distinctive, its primary focus is on the mo-
tives of the domain name registrant: it punishes only a bad faith
intent to profit. Had Star Markets and WAWA involved domain
name disputes under the ACPA, it is likely that courts would have
reached exactly the same results as under the FTDA. The registra-
tion of "starmart.com," for example, raises an issue that neither the
FTDA nor the ACPA were designed to remedy: multiple, legitimate
uses of the same mark are possible in the real world (United Air-
lines and United Van Lines, for example), but not in the virtual
world (only one company can register "united.com"). When con-
fronted with this problem, under either the FTDA or the ACPA,
courts have consistently allowed registration of a multiple-use
mark on a first-come, first-served basis. 77 Again, then, the ACPA
has not added anything to judicially developed FTDA doctrines.
If the ACPA was not necessary to protect trademark owners,
neither has it changed many results. Courts interpreting the ACPA
have sometimes carried over from the FTDA both the weak defini-
tion of fame in cybersquatting circumstances and the concern about
76. This is not to suggest that competing uses are immune from the FTDA, simply that di-
rect competitors were not its primary targets. Every court that has considered the question has
held that the FTDA reaches both competing and noncompeting uses. See, e.g., Syndicate Sales,
Inc., 192 F.3d at 640 n.6; Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 219; IP. Lund TradingApS, 163 F.3d at 45.
77. See, e.g., Hartog & Co. v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538-40 (E.D. Va. 2001); BigStar
Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 217-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Greenpoint Fin.
Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Network Net-
work v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM(ANX), 2000 WL 362016, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2000);
Cello Holdings v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); HQM, Ltd. v.
Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 503-07 (D. Md. 1999); Hasbro, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 121; see also
K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, No. 98 Civ. 3773 (LMM), 1998 WL 823657, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998)
(distinguishing Panavision where defendant had registered only four domain names, only one of
them trademarked, and had a business plan for the names); No Mayo--S.F. v. Memminger, No.
C-98-1392 PJH, 1998 WL 544974, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998) (legitimate user of trade-
marked name "is not a 'cyber pirate' "); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) (stating that "race to the Internet" by users of same name is not dilution).
2002]
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the potential breadth of dilution causes of action. Although the
ACPA decreases the importance of a finding of fame-since the
cause of action lies to protect trademarks that are either famous or
distinctive-courts have nevertheless generally found marks to be
both famous and distinctive even in situations in which "fame" is
relatively modest: for example, the use of "Joe Cartoon" for cartoon
graphics. 78 Thus, even when applying the ACPA, courts have made
findings that would justify relief under the FTDA. Conversely, like
the FTDA, the ACPA limits the supply of available words by pro-
tecting even noncompeting uses of trademarked domain names. The
requirement that the cyber-pirate be shown to act in bad faith af-
fords some limit on the breadth of the cause of action. But at least
one court has also suggested that "famousness" under the ACPA
should be narrowly interpreted in order to avoid "granting 'rights in
gross' in a trademark."79 Thus, even if Congress's intent was to
grant more protection under the ACPA than under the FTDA,
courts have not generally done so-and with good reason, since ex-
tending protection for nonconfusing uses of marginally famous
marks is most easily justified when the junior user is attempting to
appropriate for itself the commercial advantages of the mark.
As with the requirements of commercial use and a showing
of dilution, then, the FTDA requirement that a mark be both fa-
mous and distinctive has not deterred courts from giving relief in
cybersquatting cases. Indeed, I have not been able to locate a do-
main name dispute case in which a defendant found liable under
the ACPA would have escaped liability under the prevailing inter-
pretation of the FTDA because of a lack of fame, commercial use, or
actual or potential dilution.
8 0
78. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482-.83 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Mattel, Inc. v. Internet
Dimensions Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10066(HB), 2000 WL 973745, at *2-10 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2000)
(holding that "Barbie" doll is both famous and distinctive so that registration of "barbiesplay-
pen.com" for pornographic web site actionable under both FTDA and ACPA); Elecs. Boutique
Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1708-10 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that
"Electronics Boutique" for video game stores is both famous and distinctive); cf. BigStar Entm't,
Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 217-18 (holding that under the FTDA, "Big Star" is neither famous nor
distinctive).
79. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Spencer, No. Civ. S-00-471 GEB PAN, 2000 WL 641209, at
*3 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2000).
80. There is a split in the circuits about whether the FTDA requires a showing of actual di-
lution or only likely dilution of the plaintiffs mark. Compare Westchester Media v. PRL USA
Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (actual dilution necessary), and Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458-61
(4th Cir. 1999) (same), with V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 471-77 (6th Cir.




The defendant's intent in using the trademark plays a differ-
ent role in infringement, dilution, and ACPA cases. For infringe-
ment, the alleged infringer's intent to copy the mark and thereby
create confusion between its product and the plaintiffs is relevant
to the question of whether there is a likelihood of confusion.8' Un-
der the FTDA, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's "will-
fulness" only if plaintiff seeks damages, costs, or attorneys' fees; the
defendant's intent is statutorily irrelevant to injunctive relief.8 2 Fi-
nally, the ACPA imposes liability only for a "bad faith intent to
profit" from the use of the mark; good faith uses are not action-
able.8 3
The ACPA requirement of bad faith is designed to narrow
the breadth of the statute and to avoid penalizing anyone except
classic cybersquatters.8 4 In order to avoid giving greater protection
to trademark owners, then, the ACPA interposes an additional pre-
requisite to recovery. For that reason, the ACPA's different intent
requirement is unlikely to offer any greater protection to trademark
owners than is provided by the already-existing FTDA and Lanham
Act. Imagine that Toeppen, our cybersquatting entrepreneur,
had-after a dispute with Panavision about a defective television
set-simply registered panavision.com and connected that domain
name to scenic views of Pana. In this counterfactual scenario, he
did not try to sell the name back to Panavision, nor did he register
any other trademarked names. Under the ACPA, it is unclear
whether Panavision could prevail, since it would be difficult to
demonstrate Toeppen's bad faith intent to profit. Of the nine factors
listed in the ACPA for determining bad faith, it seems likely that
four would favor Toeppen and five would favor Panavision. Never-
theless, the mere existence of the web site at that URL address
81. See, e.g., King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90
(10th Cir. 1999); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1053-54 (9th Cir. 1999); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998);
Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993); Polaroid Corp. v.
Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
83. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i), (d)(1)(B)(ii).




would dilute Panavision's trademark. It is thus a clearer violation
of the FTDA than of the ACPA. 85
Nor does the ACPA offer greater protection for innocent do-
main name registrants, since a plaintiff can choose to file suit un-
der either statute. That our hypothetical Toeppen would probably
prevail on an ACPA claim does not preempt Panavision from suing
him under the FTDA instead.
Thus, since the ACPA neither provides greater protection to
mark owners nor reduces the protection available under the FTDA,
the ACPA seems paradigmatically redundant, at least as far as the
different intent requirements are concerned. Moreover, as noted
earlier, courts have essentially created an intent requirement under
the FTDA unless the disputed trademark is unequivocally and uni-
versally famous. Thus, the different intent requirements do not end
up making much difference to the results.
Whenever a statute sets out an intent test, moreover, it can-
not help but create uncertainty at the margins. Cello Holdings v.
Lawrence-Dahl Cos.86 is a typical example. Plaintiff, a high-end au-
dio equipment provider, had registered "Cello" as a trademark. The
defendant sold vintage audio equipment online under the name Au-
dio Online, and also had a sideline business: he registered numer-
ous domain names-mostly those not trademarked-with NSI, in-
cluding "gotmilk.com," "4nasdaq.com," "thenyse.com," and "gold-
metal.com," and offered them for general sale on the Internet. This
second part of his business had resulted in the sale of two domain
names for a total of $1,100. In 1997, defendant tried to register the
names of at least twenty musical instruments, including "vio-
lin.com" and "drums.com." Only "cello.com" was available, however,
and defendant obtained it. He then offered cello.com for sale to at
least nine companies or individuals, including the plaintiff, for
about $5,000. Plaintiff replied to this solicitation with a federal
lawsuit under the FTDA and the ACPA.
In denying Cello Holdings' motion for summary judgment,
the court held that numerous genuine issues of fact existed, includ-
ing both the fame and distinctiveness of the cello mark. It also
found a genuine dispute of fact with regard to bad faith-and with
good reason. It is hard to tell whether this defendant was an enter-
prising capitalist, purchasing apparently unowned goods that oth-
85. See infra Part .B for a discussion of whether either the ACPA or the FTDA is insuffi-
ciently sensitive to First Amendment concerns in cases such as this one.
86. 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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ers might want and then looking for buyers, or a cyber-pirate who
stole trademarks from their rightful owners in hope of holding them
for ransom. Most cybersquatters seem to ask for tens-if not hun-
dreds-of thousands of dollars,87 and most target potential buyers
by zeroing in on particular trademarks. Perhaps this defendant was
simply an inept cybersquatter, but it is also possible that this is not
the type of activity that Congress meant to proscribe.
In any case, the different intent requirements do not under-
mine my contention that the ACPA was unnecessary because it du-
•plicates remedies available under other statutes. At best, the ACPA
seems to offer no more assistance to an aggrieved trademark
holder; at worst, some plaintiffs may have a paradoxically harder
time using the ACPA because of its heightened intent requirement.
5. Remedies
The ACPA also provides remedies that differ from those pro-
vided under the FTDA. The remedy for ordinary trademark dilution
is normally an injunction against further use of the mark by the
defendant.88 In cybersquatting cases, however, the plaintiff usually
also wants to be able to use its own mark as a domain name. Again,
courts have had no difficulty under the FTDA ordering defendants
to relinquish all rights to the disputed domain name, thus freeing it
87. See, e.g., TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir.
2001) (concerning defendant who asked for a total of $1,267,000 for numerous related names and
rejected counter-offer of $30,000 for single name); Domain Name Clearing Co. v. F.C.F. Inc., No.
00-2509, 2001 WL 788975, at *1 (4th Cir. July 12, 2001) (per curiam) (concerning defendant who
asked for approximately $60,000); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1998) (concerning defendant who offered to sell domain names for $10,000 to $15,000);
BroadBridge Media, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (concerning defendant who rejected $5,000 offer and
asked for $85,000 for the sale of the name or $153,000 over three years for rental); McRae's, Inc.
v. Hussain, 105 F. Supp. 2d 594, 595 n.2 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (concerning defendant who offered to
sell carsonpiriescott.com and carsonpiriescott.net to mark owner for "10% of the future revenue
that these web addresses will generate in the first three years of operation," reminding plaintiff
to "[t]hink of all that online shopping"); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp.
2d 1154, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (concerning defendant who said he would only sell domain name
for "several million dollars" and "made a proposal involving monthly payments in perpetuity");
cf. Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(concerning defendant who earned between $800,000 and $1,000,000 annually from cybersquat-
ting).
88. Again, at least one commentator predicted that this limitation would make the FTDA
"of little or no help" against cybersquatters. Carl Oppedahl, Remedies in Domain Name Law-
suits: How Is a Domain Name like a Cow?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 437, 448
(1997).
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for subsequent use by the plaintiff.8 9 Courts have also ordered de-
fendants to transfer domain names to plaintiffs.90 And in at least
one FTDA case, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), the private com-
pany in charge of registering domain names at that time, had "de-
posited complete control and authority over the disposition and use
of the [disputed] domain name" into the court itself91-- an action
specifically contemplated by the not-yet-enacted ACPA but not by
the FTDA.
6. In Rem Jurisdiction
Suits against cybersquatters present potentially difficult
questions of personal jurisdiction. While most state long-arm stat-
utes are broad enough to reach conduct, such as trademark in-
fringement or dilution, which has an effect inside the states, the
constitutional requirements under the Due Process Clause are
somewhat more limiting. Black letter law requires that in order to
be subject to personal jurisdiction, the defendant must have mini-
mum contacts with the forum state such that the court's exercise of
jurisdiction is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 92 As I discuss in Part III, courts initially strug-
gled with questions about the extent to which the creation of a web
site constitutes minimum contacts with any forum in which it is
accessible. As courts reached a consensus that the establishment of
a "passive" (or noninteractive) web site is not by itself sufficient to
confer jurisdiction, the question of jurisdiction over cybersquatters
became more complex: the classic cybersquatter often does no more
89. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn. 1998);
Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D. Va. 1997); Lozano Enters. v. La
Opinion Publ'g Co., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1764, 1769-70 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
90. See, e.g., N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331, 333 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co.,
992 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (N.D. Iowa 1997); ActMedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., No.
96C3448, 1996 WL 466527, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996); cf. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider
Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1042 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (ordering transfer of domain name under
state anti-dilution statute).
91. Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220, 1220 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (ordering cancellation of domain names "if [NSI] delegates complete control regarding
the disposition of the registration and use of these domain names to this Court").
92. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987); Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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than register the domain name or, as Dennis Toeppen did, create a
passive and noncommercial web site.
To avoid this potential problem with jurisdiction, the ACPA
provides an alternative to an in personam action against the do-
main name registrant: it creates an in rem action against the do-
main name itself. The in rem action is available only if the plaintiff,
after due diligence, either cannot locate the domain name regis-
trant or "is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over" the
registrant. 93 The statute does not make clear whether the plaintiff
must show only that the court in which it has filed lacks personal
jurisdiction or whether the plaintiff must show that no American
court can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. The only court
that has directly addressed the issue has concluded that the in rem
action is available only if no American court has jurisdiction. 94 For
this reason, the in rem provision is likely to apply in only a limited
number of cases, that is, where the registrant is unknown or for-
eign.
In fact, courts have had little trouble exercising personal ju-
risdiction over cybersquatters even absent the ACPA's in rem pro-
vision. Courts have consistently held-in domain name disputes as
well as other cases-that the mere registration of a domain name,
or the establishment of a "passive" web site at that URL, does not
constitute minimum contacts with any other state, including the
state in which the registration occurred. 95 Courts have required
that the defendant do something more, somehow directing its ac-
tions toward the forum state. But courts confronted with bad-faith
registration of domain names-cybersquatting--quickly found ways
to conclude that the defendant had targeted the forum state.
An offer to sell the domain name back to the trademark
owner, for example, has been held to constitute activity directed
toward the trademark owner's home state. 96 Even in the absence of
attempted extortion, cyber-pirates are usually subject to personal
jurisdiction in the trademark owner's state. Following a seminal
Seventh Circuit decision in a non-Internet context, Indianapolis
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)I) (Supp. V 1999).
94. Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 864 n.6 (E.D. Va.
2000); see also Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v. casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340,
346-47 n.14 (E.D. Va. 2001) (considering this the "likely answer").
95. See cases cited infra note 221.
96. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998); Cello
Holdings v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also N. Light Tech.,
Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 107 (D. Mass. 2000) (attempting to use domain name to
entice plaintiff into business relationship), aff'd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
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Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd. Partner-
ship,97 a number of courts have found that the act of registering a
domain name that intentionally targets a particular trademark
owner constitutes an act directed toward the trademark owner's
home state. 98
Courts have also found jurisdiction over foreign registrants if
the foreign registrant uses the domain name to enter the U.S. mar-
ket. In Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup International, Ltd., for example,
the court held that it had personal jurisdiction over a New Zealand
company. 99 The company's web site included advertisements for at
least ten American companies (including several that did business
only in the United States), and when it negotiated for advertisers,
the company quoted prices in American dollars. 100 The court con-
cluded that the company, by targeting American consumers, had
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the United States com-
mercial forum. 101
As with the attenuation of the "famousness" requirement,
there is a danger that a desire to reach cyber-pirates might distort
doctrines of personal jurisdiction. But courts have been careful, un-
der both the ACPA and its predecessors, to distinguish between cy-
ber-pirates and more innocent trademark infringers. As noted ear-
lier, courts dealing with cybersquatters have found that registra-
97. 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994). The court in Indianapolis Colts in turn relied on Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which held that an act of defamation occurring in Florida but inten-
tionally harming a California plaintiff satisfied the requirements of personal jurisdiction in a
California court. 34 F.3d at 412. Courts are divided on the precise reach of Calder's "effects" test,
but have had no additional trouble translating it from the real world to the virtual world. See
infra note 242. Indeed, one commentator suggests that the courts have exhibited a laudable
"sensitivity" to subtle factual differences when applying the effects test to the web. Allan R.
Stein, The Unexceptional Problem ofJurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 INT'L LAW. 1167, 1184 (1998).
98. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1322-23 (concerning defendant who was "engaged
in a scheme" that he knew would have the effect of causing injury in plaintiffs home state);
McRae's v. Hussain, 105 F. Supp. 2d 594, 600 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (holding that defendant's act of
registering was "intentionally directed" toward the plaintiff since the plaintiff, "as owner of the
mark, was the only legitimate potential buyer of the mark"); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Com-
puter Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that defendant intentionally
altered web site to "exploit the plaintiffs' goodwill" and that "brunt of the harm" was felt in cor-
porate plaintiffs' home state); Roberts-Gordon, LLC v. Superior Radiant Prods., Ltd., 85 F. Supp.
2d 202, 216-17 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that intentional placement of plaintiffs trademarks in
defendant's metatags satisfies requirement that defendant commit a tort with the expectation
that its effects will be felt in the forum state); McMaster-Carr Supply Co. v. Supply Depot, Inc.,
No. 98 C 1903, 1999 WL 417352, at *4-5 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1999) (holding that defendant
"intentionally registered" plaintiffs trademark as domain name, "an act that it knew would
harm Illinois-based MCS in Illinois," and did so "to siphon off potential customers").
99. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1110-14 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
100. Id. at 1112.
101. Id. at 1114-15; see also N. Light Tech., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
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tion of a particular trademark as a domain name intentionally tar-
gets the trademark owner, thus constituting a sufficient additional
contact with the forum to create personal jurisdiction. In the ab-
sence of evidence of bad faith, however, courts have been unwilling
to extend this principle to all those who simply register another's
trademark as a domain name. If the domain name registrant is un-
aware of the trademark or has a legitimate reason to choose the
mark as a domain name, courts consistently require more tradi-
tional indicia of contacts with the forum state than simple registra-
tion of a trademarked domain name.
10 2
Here again, the ACPA has not altered doctrines of personal
jurisdiction: in personam suits, at least, are neither easier nor
harder to bring under the ACPA than under previous trademark
statutes.
There remains, however, the question of domain name regis-
trants who cannot be located, or foreign registrants with virtually
no other contacts in the United States. Although plaintiffs have
successfully used the in rem provisions against foreign registrants,
in many cases the same result could have been reached under the
developing doctrines of personal jurisdiction in cybersquatter cases.
In BroadBridge Media v. hypercd.com, for example, the Canadian
defendant offered to sell the domain name to the plaintiff, engaging
in negotiations over several days. 10 3 The Ninth Circuit in Panavi-
sion held similar conduct sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In
Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. technodome.com, the plaintiff alleged-as
required under the ACPA-that the defendant had registered its
domain names "in a bad faith attempt to profit from use of Plain-
tiffs marks."10 4 Other courts, taking the plaintiffs allegations as
102. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997); Ben-
susan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27-29 (2d Cir. 1997); Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 848, 858-59 (E.D. Va. 2000); Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 685-
87 (E.D. Va. 1999); No Mayo--S.F. v. Memminger, No. C-98-1392PJH, 1998 WL 544974, at *3-4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL
97097, at *15 n.16, 19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); see also Ira S. Nathenson, Showdown at the
Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers, and
Other Parasites, 58 U. PT. L. REV. 911, 942-50 (1997) (urging the adoption of such a distinc-
tion).
103. 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
104. 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 861 (E.D. Va. 2000); see also V'soske, Inc. v. vsoske.com, No. 00
CIV. 6099 (DC), 2001 WL 546567, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v.
www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522 (E.D. Va. 2000). In both Heathmount A.E. Corp. and
Banco Inverlat, the plaintiff brought the suit in the Eastern District of Virginia, where NSI is
located, rather than in the plaintiffs home state. (I discuss infra text accompanying notes 115-
21, whether in rem suits can only be brought in that district.) Even under the Indianapolis Colts
theory, of course, the defendants had no minimum contacts with Virginia. But presumably the
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true, have found such an intent to be a sufficient contact with the
plaintiffs home state to satisfy due process under the Indianapolis
Colts theory. Thus, although in both BroadBridge Media and
Heathmount A.E. Corp. the courts held an in rem suit appropriate
because personal jurisdiction was lacking, it is probable that in the
absence of the ACPA the courts would have examined the precedent
more carefully and found the requisite personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. 10 5
Only if the plaintiff fails to allege bad faith--or if there is
sufficient evidence to overcome that allegation--does the problem of
personal jurisdiction become acute. But courts have generally held
that an allegation of bad faith is necessary even in an in rem suit,
dismissing such suits where bad faith is absent. 1 6 Moreover, the
purpose of the ACPA is to remedy cyber-piracy, not innocent trade-
mark infringement, and thus the in rem provisions should not be
invoked in the absence of bad faith.
What about mark owners who cannot locate the registrants
of infringing domain names? I have found only two cases in which
plaintiffs attempted to use the in rem provisions of the ACPA in
that circumstance. 0 7 In one case, the domain name registrant never
responded, and the plaintiff was awarded the name in a default
judgment. 08 In the other, the court dismissed the action, finding
that the plaintiff had not exercised due diligence in searching for
the registrant. 10 9 The plaintiff later found the registrant and sued
him in personam. 110
Finally, had Congress not enacted the ACPA, it is at least
possible that courts would have developed a doctrine of in rem ju-
risdiction on their own. At least two plaintiffs' lawyers' creativity
plaintiffs could have brought an in personam suit in their own home states, thus triggering the
Indianapolis Colts analysis.
105. The same arguments may be made about the additional cases cited supra note 104.
106. See, e.g., Hartog & Co. v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (E.D. Va. 2001); Harrods
Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d. 420, 421 (E.D. Va. 2000). But see Jack in
the Box, Inc. v. jackinthebox.org, 143 F. Supp. 2d 590, 592 (E.D. Va. 2001) (offering rather con-
fused analysis finding that allegation of bad faith is unnecessary but allegation of likelihood of
confusion is necessary). In the Harrods case, plaintiff refiled the complaint, alleging bad faith,
and ultimately prevailed. 157 F. Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Va. 2001).
107. I searched the Westlaw "AllFeds" data base for " 'in rem'/S 'domain name' " on August
16, 2001. I do not discuss here the cases, explored infra Part I.B, in which courts held that they
lacked jurisdiction on the ground that ACPA in rem actions can only be brought in the district in
which the registrar (NSI and its successors) is located.
108. Jack in the Box, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
109. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (E.D. Va. 2000).
110. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Johnson, No. CV 00-05668-GHK RNBX, 2000 WIL 1604055
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
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led them to bring in rem suits against domain names, alleging vari-
ous trademark violations, prior to the enactment of the ACPA. In
one case, the court allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint
some nine months later to allege a claim under the newly enacted
ACPA, thus avoiding the need to decide whether the original in rem
action could be maintained."' In the other case, the district court
dismissed the action, holding that the FTDA did not permit suits in
rem. 112 Plaintiffs appealed, but the intervening enactment of the
ACPA spared the court of appeals from reaching the question: it
remanded the case for consideration of the application of the
ACPA. 113 In the absence of the ACPA, perhaps courts would ulti-
mately have concluded that in rem actions were available for
trademark infringement or dilution by domain names. 114
The in rem provisions of the ACPA, then, unlike the substan-
tive provisions, do add to the previous remedies afforded trademark
owners, but not significantly. The provisions make it easier to sue
foreign defendants, although those defendants would probably be
amenable to jurisdiction under existing doctrines. The provisions
may also prove useful in the case of unknown or unlocated domain
name registrants, but the record to date suggests that those cases
may be rare.
In light of the additional utility-however limited--of the in
rem provisions, I would have no quarrel with them if they were
well-drafted to avoid confusion. As I discuss in the next section,
however, the in rem provisions are causing confusion and complex-
ity. That confusion is too high a price to pay for a statute that adds
so little to existing law.
111. Caesars World, Inc. v. caesars-palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 505, 506-09 (E.D. Va. 2000).
112. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. allporshe.com 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (E.D. Va. 2000) va-
cated and remanded sub nom. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. allporsche.com, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th
Cir. 2000). The discussion of the viability of in rem suits may actually be somewhat limited. The
court notes that only some of the registrants of the offending domain names are unknown, and
concludes: "The Due Process Clause requires at least some appreciation for the differences be-
tween [known and unknown registrants], and Porsche's pursuit of an in rem remedy that fails to
differentiate between them at all is fatal to its Complaint." Id.
The lawyer who represented Porsche (and other trademark owners) later testified before
Congress, using the sad story of the district court dismissal as the primary evidence of the neces-
sity of the ACPA. See infra Part I.D.
113. See allporsche.com, 215 F.3d at 1320.
114. For an article urging such a result, see Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97 (2000).
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B. The ACPA Is Causing Harm
Most statutes have advantages and disadvantages. Under
ordinary circumstances, we expect that Congress will pass a law
only if its perceived advantages outweigh its perceived disadvan-
tages. In regulating cyberlaw, however, where the disadvantages
are largely intangible, we might expect laws to slip through that, on
closer examination, do not satisfy this cost-benefit analysis. The
ACPA is such a statute.
I have just argued that the advantages of the ACPA are
minimal. Its disadvantages are not overwhelming, either, but they
are greater than its almost nonexistent benefits. The ACPA is caus-
ing two kinds of harm, both difficult to identify or measure if one
looks only to tangible interests such as those of trademark owners,
consumers, and cybersquatters.
First is the harm to the legal regime itself. Whenever Con-
gress enacts a new statute affecting actions that are already subject
to other laws, some preliminary confusion is bound to occur. When
faced with the new statute, courts must interpret the new language
and figure out how the new statute fits into, adds to, or modifies the
existing regulatory regime. The ACPA is no exception.
The most significant source of confusion is the in rem provi-
sions. Courts have split first on where the ACPA allows an in rem
action to be brought. Several courts have focused on the language of
section (2)(A), which provides:
The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the
judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or
other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is lo-
cated .... 115
These courts have held that in rem jurisdiction lies only in the dis-
trict in which NSI or its successors reside.116 At least one court has
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999). Confusingly, § 1125(d)(2)(C) seems to locate
the res itself-the domain name-in any district in which a court has control over it:
(C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to
have its situs in the judicial district in which
(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the dis-
position of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the
court.
116. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, No. OOCIV8705, DLC 2001 WL 436207, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2001) (dismissing action for lack of jurisdiction over domain name registered
with Maryland registrar, despite plaintiffs deposit into court of "documents establishing control
over the registration and use of the domain name"); FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. fleetbostonfinan-
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expressed doubts about the constitutionality of any broader juris-
dictional interpretation: after an extended discussion of Shaffer v.
Heitner,117 the court concluded that the minimum contacts test of
International Shoe"18 applied to in rem as well as quasi in rem ac-
tions.1 19 Whether or not that is a fair reading of Shaffer,120 the in-
jection of such a difficult question into the domain name cases un-
dermines the utility of the ACPA in rem proceeding as a stream-
lined method of resolving domain name disputes. The conclusion
that suits can only be brought in the registrar's home district,
moreover, may overburden a few federal courts. In any case, there
is a division of authority: other courts, without discussion, have al-
lowed in rem suits in districts other than the registrar's home dis-
trict, as long as the court obtains control over the domain name.12'
Another question also arises under the in rem provisions. By
its terms, the ACPA only permits in rem suits if personal jurisdic-
tion cannot be obtained over the domain name owner (or if the
owner cannot be found). 122 Courts have therefore confronted the
cial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (D. Mass. 2001) (dismissing action for lack of jurisdiction over
domain name registered with Virginia-based NSI, despite deposit into court of Registration Cer-
tificate and noting that § 1125(d)(2)(C) exists only "to facilitate the continuation of litigation in
one of the districts identified in subparagraph (2)(A)").
117. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
118. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
119. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 131-35.
120. One court has reached a contrary result, holding the in rem provision of the ACPA ap-
plicable despite the absence of minimum contacts. Cable News Network L.P. v. cnnews.com, 162
F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001). Outside the Internet context, most courts agree that
Shaffer does not apply to in rem actions. See, e.g., RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 964-
65 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that minimum contacts are not necessary in in rem actions); United
States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 893 F.2d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc). At least one commentator disagrees. See An-
gela M. Bohmann, Applicability of Shaffer to Admiralty In Rern Jurisdiction, 53 TUL. L. REV.
135, 141-45 (1978-1979) (arguing that Shaffer does apply to in rem actions in admiralty). For a
thorough discussion of Shaffer (although not dealing with this particular issue), see generally
Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978).
121. See, e.g., V'soske, Inc. v. vsoske.com, No. 00 CIV 6099(DC), 2001 WL 546567, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508-09
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
122.
(2)(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name
in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry,
or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is lo-
cated if
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c); and
(ii) the court finds that the owner
(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would
have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
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question of the burden of proof required to find an absence of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The two courts that have addressed the issue
have held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that it is not able to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant. 123 But since the plaintiff tradition-
ally also bears the burden of proving the existence of jurisdiction,1
24
that potentially leaves plaintiffs in a rather difficult situation.
The allocation of the burden of proof to one party can mean
that in close cases that party will lose. So if the question of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant is close, a plaintiff may find itself
without any cause of action under the ACPA: unable to definitively
prove or disprove personal jurisdiction, it will not be able to bring
either an in personam or an in rem action. While this Catch-22
situation may seem only a remote possibility, it does undermine the
usefulness of the ACPA to potential plaintiffs seeking the promised
easy remedy for cybersquatting, as well as illustrate the problems
that may arise from hastily drafted statutes.
The jurisdictional difficulties in close cases are compounded
by another ruling by one of the two courts that have addressed the
burden of proof question. Confronted with an attempt to bring in
rem and in personam suits simultaneously, the court easily con-
cluded that because the ACPA clearly provides for in rem jurisdic-
tion only if in personam jurisdiction is lacking, the two alternatives
are "mutually exclusive avenues for relief against putative infring-
ers."'125 That much seems incontrovertible. But the court went on to
hold:
In this regard, a mark owner may not simultaneously file an in rem cause of action
and an in personan claim in the hope that one claim will survive the court's juris-
dictional inquiry. Rather, a mark owner must choose prior to filing whether to pro-
ceed in rem against the domain name or in personam against a putative in-
fringer. 126
(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have
been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
123. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 n.17
(E.D. Va. 2001); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 862-63 (E.D.
Va. 2000). Both courts also concluded that the plaintiff must show an absence of jurisdiction in
any American forum. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 347 n.14; Heath-
mount A.E. Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 864 n.6.
124. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 188 (3d ed. 1999).
125. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
126. Id. at 346 n.13. This seems contrary to FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2) & 18(a), which allow
pleading alternative theories of relief.
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Thus, a plaintiff not only bears the burden of proving or disproving
jurisdiction over the defendant; the plaintiff also has to guess in
advance which way the court will rule. 
127
This type of confusion is the inevitable consequence of a new
statute, a confusion only exacerbated by poor drafting. If my thesis
is correct, the courts will eventually sort it out and reach a reason-
able and predictable interpretation of the in rem provisions of the
ACPA. But even if only temporary, conflicting, confusing, or unpre-
dictable court decisions do some damage to the stability of the legal
landscape. Such detrimental effects, however minor, should be jus-
tified by a corresponding benefit from the statute. I suggested in
Part L.A that the ACPA offers no commensurate benefit.
Moreover, the ACPA is also causing more substantial harm
to a more important intangible interest. What is particularly trou-
bling about some of the confusion generated by the ACPA is that it
implicates the First Amendment. A prohibition against paradig-
matic cybersquatting-the intentional registration of another's
trademark in order to profit commercially-presents no more First
Amendment problems than would use of the trademark on a com-
peting good in order to deceive the public. But sometimes a trade-
mark is used within a domain name not for commercial purposes
but to make a statement about the trademark holder. Examples
include the registration of "plannedparenthood.com" by an anti-
abortion activist; the registration of "lucentsucks.com" by a critic of
Lucent Technologies; and the registration of "morrisonandfoer-
ster.com" (and related names) by an opponent of "corporate Amer-
ica" and its lawyers. The web sites identified by such domain names
are sometimes called "gripe sites."
Prior to the ACPA, the courts had a mixed record of sensitiv-
ity to free speech issues raised by gripe sites. Under traditional
trademark law, use of a trademark as "part of a communicative
message" would be protected. 128 In non-Internet trademark cases, a
127. The court did note that "if a mark owner's first choice falters, the alternative then may
be pursued by refiling or seeking to amend the complaint." Id. While the availability of that
course of action saves the statute from a charge of being simply a trap for the unwary, it does
add significant time and expense to what is supposed to be a streamlined proceeding.
128. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996);
Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Dou-
bleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989); L.L. Bean Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir.
1987). But see Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1994); cf.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-22 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing). See generally Jon H. Oram, Will the Real Candidate Please Stand Up?: Political Parody on
the Internet, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 467, 493-98 (1998). '
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balancing test ensured that the public interest in free expression
could rarely be overcome by legitimate parody or political criti-
cism. 129 But even before the ACPA took aim at domain name dis-
putes, courts were viewing Internet political expression with a
much more skeptical eye, finding both "commercial use" and likeli-
hood of confusion more easily in cases involving web sites than in
non-Internet uses of trademarks.
One early commentator' 30 tellingly compared Planned Par-
enthood Federation of America v. Bucci'31 with International Asso-
ciation of Machinists v. Winship Green Nursing Center.132 In
Planned Parenthood, the court concluded that the public was likely
to be confused, even if only temporarily, when entering "planned-
parenthood.com" brought to the screen an anti-abortion web site. In
Winship Green Nursing Center, by contrast, the court held that
there was no likelihood of confusion when management circulated
letters on union letterhead implying that employees would be fired,
and their union dues raised, if the union won the election.13 3 After
Planned Parenthood, other courts using pre-ACPA trademark law
also curtailed web sites that were arguably political criticism and
that would likely be protected in any medium other than the Inter-
net. 134
The insensitivity to First Amendment interests exhibited by
these courts may be a symptom of the newness of the technology. A
few cases have recognized a distinction between cyber-piracy and
gripe sites. 135 Given more time, and perhaps some helpful critical
commentary, courts might have ieached some accommodation be-
tween trademark rights and free speech rights under the FTDA.
For example, it is possible to distinguish Planned Parent-
hood from another case enjoining an arguably political web site,
There is some dispute about whether (and how) the copyright doctrine of fair use, including
the protection for parodies, applies to trademark law. But as one court has noted, that dispute is
not relevant when the purpose of the junior user is to comment on the senior user itself, rather
than to make unrelated comments or sell unrelated goods. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1572 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
129. See Oram, supra note 128, at 497.
130. See id at 500.
131. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
132. 103 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1996).
133. See Oram, supra note 128, at 500.
134. See, e.g., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y.
2000); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 303 (D.N.J. 1998).
135. See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (refusing to enjoin compupix.com/ballysucks web site).
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Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky. 136 In Planned Parenthood, the URL
plannedparenthood.com called up a web site that purported to be
the home page of the real Planned Parenthood organization, pro-
longing any potential confusion. 137 It was only after scrolling or
clicking through several screens that a web-surfer might realize
that she had not in fact reached Planned Parenthood. In Jews for
Jesus, by contrast, the initial web site called up by the domain-
name "jewsforjesus.org" clearly proclaimed that it was neither af-
filiated with, nor in agreement with the tenets of, the plaintiff or-
ganization. One might argue that under these circumstances, en-
joining "plannedparenthood.com" was more justifiable than enjoin-
ing "jewsforjesus.com." Perhaps courts might have eventually set-
tled on this or some other plausible distinction in applying the
FTDA and the Lanham Act to domain name disputes. Perhaps they
still will. 1
38
In the meantime, however, the ACPA has prolonged the
process of accommodation and exacerbated the difficulties. Even to
the extent that the ACPA simply duplicates previously available
remedies, it nevertheless requires courts to analyze the tension be-
tween trademark law and the First Amendment under new statu-
tory language, jeopardizing whatever progress had been made un-
der earlier statutes. To whatever degree courts were beginning to
weigh First Amendment concerns against trademark rights in
FTDA cases, confronting the new language of the ACPA means that
they will have to begin anew. 139 In addition, the ACPA gives trade-
136. 993 F. Supp. at 282.
137. Note that the question of "initial confusion" is not addressed by either the FTDA or the
ACPA, and courts have been using common law techniques to deal with it. See infra Part I.C.
138. Another distinction might be whether the site was always and only a gripe site, or
whether uploading criticism onto the site seems to be merely a way to protect the domain name
registrant from a charge of cyber-piracy. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F.
Supp. 2d 1033, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (concerning defendant who registered "ernestandjulio-
gallo.com" with admitted hope of interesting Gallo in purchasing name, and who, after litigation
began, established web site at that domain name, criticizing Gallo, alcohol, and "big business").
139. Under the ACPA, just as under the FTDA, courts are split on the appropriate treatment
of gripe sites. Compare Lucent Techs., Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535-36 (E.D.
Va. 2000) ("A successful showing that lucentsucks.com is effective parody and/or a cite [sic] for
critical commentary would seriously undermine the requisite elements for [the ACPA].'), with
Lucent Techs. v. Johnson, No. CV 00-05668-GHK RNBX, 2000 WL 1604055, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 12, 2000) (rejecting "per se rule that 'yourcompanynamesucks' domain names, as a group,
merit application of a 'safe harbor' defense on First Amendment grounds"). In general, courts
that have addressed both ACPA and FTDA claims together have generally reached the same
results under both statutes. See, e.g., Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108,
1122-25 (D. Minn. 2000) (ordering no preliminary injunction under either ACPA or FTDA for
gripe site); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915,
2002] 347
348 VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 55:309
mark owners another weapon with which to threaten those who es-
tablish gripe sites. Verizon, for example, after carefully registering
verizonsucks.com, was dismayed when an online magazine regis-
tered verizonreallysucks.com. It sent the publisher a letter warning
that the magazine's registration of the domain name "infringes Bell
Atlantic's valuable trademark rights in the 'Verizon' mark and vio-
lates the new Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act."'140
Moreover, the ACPA might make it even easier to attack
gripe sites. One commentator concludes that "the ACPA has
granted trademark owners more control over the use of the marks
as domain names than they have for any other use."'1' Since courts
under prior trademark law were, as we have just seen, already ac-
cording trademarks somewhat more protection on the Internet than
elsewhere, any additional protection afforded by the ACPA will cut
further into the domain of freedom of speech.
Some courts have already exhibited confusion about the rela-
tionship between bad faith under the ACPA and willfulness under
the FTDA,142 essentially reducing the ACPA requirement to "bad
faith" rather than "bad faith intent to profit." Since virtually by
920 (E.D. Va. 2000) (ordering summary judgment for plaintiff under both ACPA and FTDA for
domain name peta.org, which brings up web site labeled "People Eating Tasty Animals").
140. Wired News, Real Cybersquatting Really Sucks (May 9, 2000), available at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/-0,1367,36210,00.html. The magazine's owner was not
deterred, promptly registering the domain name VerizonShouldSpendMoreTimeFixingItsNet-
workAndLessMoneyOnLawyers.com. Id.
141. Blasbalg, supra note 58, at 567; see also David C. Najarian, Internet Domains and
Trademark Claims: First Amendment Considerations, 41 IDEA 127, 145 (2001) (arguing that
ACPA is "two steps backward" in protection of free expression); Alanna C. Rutherford, Sporty's
Farm v. Sportsman's Market: A Case Study in Internet Regulation Gone Awry, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
421, 441 (2000) (suggesting that the ACPA is at the bottom of a slippery slope begun by dilution
laws).
Others have expressed concern that courts have allowed large corporations to "reverse hi-
jack" domain names, by bullying a smaller company with a legitimate claim to a particular do-
main name into giving up the name under threat of litigation, a practice some worry might be-
come easier under the ACPA. See, e.g., David P. Collins, Casenote, Internet Ambush: Using the
Patent and Trademark Office to Shut Down a Competitor's Domain-Name, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 231,
249-53 (1999); Kevin K. Eng, Note, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of Trade-
mark Rights in Domain Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, at *76-78
(2000), at http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech; Kaplan, supra note 42, at 76-78; Matthew Edward
Searing, Note, What's in a Domain Name? A Critical Analysis of the National and International
Impact on Domain Name Cybersquatting, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 110, 134 (2000). A particularly
egregious example of reverse hijacking was the attempt by the makers of Gumby and Pokey toys
to take the domain name "pokey.org" from a twelve-year-old whose nickname was Pokey. See
Mark Grossman & Allison K. Hift, Is the Cybersquatting Cure Worse than the Disease?, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2000, at 24, 24.
142. See, e.g., United Greeks, Inc. v. Klein, No. 00-CV-0002, 2000 WL 554196 (N.D.N.Y. May
2, 2000); Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
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definition gripe sites involve bad faith in the broadest sense-at
least insofar as they disparage or attack a trademark owner-the
ACPA might cover them all. Indeed, one court has held that an ad-
mitted intent to "get even with" or "mess with" a trademark owner
offers "[t]he most persuasive reason for concluding that [the defen-
dant] acted with bad faith intent."'143 The ACPA's potential incur-
sion into protected speech is thus a troubling possibility.
To the extent that the ACPA does alter the preexisting law,
then, it does so in ways that either increase confusion or heighten
the tension between trademark protection and the First Amend-
ment. Again, this seems to be a high price for such a small gain.
C. The ACPA Is Already Becoming Obsolete
1. Cyber-Mischief Innovations
Congress may act more quickly than the courts, but the
Internet changes even faster. The final problem with the ACPA is
that it deals only with yesterday's problems, not today's. It has
nothing to say, for example, about the use of trademarks in meta-
tags. Metatags are computer-readable material, embedded into web
sites but unseen by the consumer. They are chosen by the web site
owner in order to alert search engines to the contents of the site.
For many people, search engines such as AltaVista or Google
provide an entry point into the worldwide web.144 These search en-
gines work by essentially crawling around the web and looking not
only at the web site itself, but also at the metatags and other em-
bedded material. (Some search engines look only at the embedded
portion, others only at the visible portion, and still others examine
both parts.) The search engine stores the metatags it has discovered
(and their Internet locations), and when an individual enters words
into a search engine it produces a matching list of sites. 145
143. Morrison & Foerster LLP, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. For a general critique of courts' inter-
pretations of "bad faith intent to profit," see Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Blame It on the Cybersquatters:
How Congress Partially Ends the Circus Among the Circuits with the Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act, 32 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 777, 801-06 (2001).
144. Yahoo, another popular method of searching the web, is a human-composed index rather
than a mechanical search engine. See DON SELLERS, GETTING HITS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO
PROMOTING YOUR WEB SITE 3-4 (1997). It is therefore not as susceptible to metatag abuse.
145. For descriptions of how search engines and metatags work, see Askan Deutsch, Con-
cealed Information in Web Pages: Metatags and U.S. Trademark Law, 31 INT'L REV. OF INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 845, 847-52 (2000); Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink:
Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 59-64 (1998); Maureen
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Cyber-pirates quickly realized that putting a competitor's
name into their metatags might bring them additional customers. A
consumer looking for, say, McDonald's, might type "McDonald's"
into a search engine. If Burger King has included "McDonald's"
among its metatags, the search engine will produce a list that con-
tains both the McDonald's and Burger King sites. 146 A consumer
who was just looking for hamburgers-and simply remembered
McDonald's as the best-known brand-might decide to buy from
Burger King instead. Or perhaps KFC, which doesn't sell hamburg-
ers, might include "McDonald's" and "hamburgers" in its metatags,
hoping to remind consumers seeking fast food that there are alter-
natives to hamburgers. A vegetarian organization might use similar
metatags hoping to win converts to its anti-meat positions (imagine
the picture of an abattoir that might greet the consumer gt a vege-
tarian web page identified by a McDonald's metatag). Metatags
thus offer boundless opportunities for clever marketers. 147
Since the public never sees the metatags, however, and the
competing web sites are clearly marked with their own trademarks,
the use of trademarks in metatags raises difficult questions under
infringement and dilution law. How can an unseen trademark cause
confusion or dilute the distinctiveness of the mark? 148 But con-
fronted with suits alleging that using another's trademark in meta-
O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for Metatag-
ging, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 279-87 (1997-1998).
146. As well as thousands of others. Entering "McDonald's" into the Google search engine on
June 21, 2001, produced 490,000 hits. The hamburger giant was listed first. Entering "McDon-
ald's hamburgers" produced 15,000 hits, including a site discussing how many cows are slaugh-
tered each year to make McDonald's hamburgers.
147. For a description of a pornographic site cleverly incorporating scores of trademarks, see
Peter Johnson, Can You Quote Donald Duck? Intellectual Property in Cyberculture, 13 YALE J. L.
& HUMAN. 451, 481 (2001).
148. As in the case of cybersquatting, some early commentators predicted that courts might
have trouble finding the necessary elements. See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 145, at 111-18
(arguing that infringement is "conceptually inapposite" in metatag cases); O'Rourke, supra note
145, at 293-94 (arguing that infringement claims for metatags are "likely to founder on the key
element of likelihood of confusion"); id. at 302 (suggesting that dilution claims will also be of
limited value); Michael R. Sees, Comment, Use of Another's Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag:
Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham Act for Trademark Infringement, 5 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 99, 113 (1998) ("Since exposure of the trademark on the web page does not
occur, the likelihood of confusion of the prospective purchaser does not exist ...."); Scott Ship-
man, Comment, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Cyberspace: Can These Laws Deter "Bait-
ing" Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 245, 282-83 (1998) (predicting that neither
dilution nor infringement law is likely to protect trademark owners in metatag cases); Craig K.
Weaver, Note, Signpost to Oblivion? Meta-Tags Signal the Judiciary to Stop Commercial Internet
Regulation and Yield to the Electronic Marketplace, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 667, 677-83 (1998)
(same). Despite the pessimism, the common law method has nonetheless proven itself up to the
task.
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tags constituted infringement or dilution, the courts have turned to
a trademark doctrine known as "initial interest confusion."
The doctrine of "initial interest confusion" was first devel-
oped by the Second Circuit in 1987, long before the commercializa-
tion of the Internet and the subsequent plethora of Internet trade-
mark issues. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,149 the
court held that misleading potential customers through the use of a
registered mark could constitute trademark infringement even if
any confusion dissipated before a sale was made. Other courts have
also adopted the doctrine, allowing a finding of infringement even
in the absence of an actual sale. 150 It is the use of the trademark to
draw attention to one's own products-to get one's foot in the
door-that constitutes the infringing use, regardless of what fol-
lows.
Despite its development in a non-Internet context, the doc-
trine of "initial interest confusion" seems tailor-made for metatag
disputes. The Ninth Circuit was the first court to draw the analogy
between real space and cyberspace:
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with an-
other's trademark in front of one's store. Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's
call it "Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a highway reading-"West Coast
Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7"-where West Coast is really located at Exit 8 but
Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull
off at Exit 7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but see-
ing the Blockbuster store right by the highway entrance, they may simply rent
there. Even consumers who prefer West Coast may find it not worth the trouble to
continue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there. Cus-
tomers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that they are
purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster
is related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that
there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster
would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill. 151
149. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
150. See, e.g., Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, 184 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1999);
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-
Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380-81 (7th Cir. 1996); cases cited supra notes 144-45; see also People for
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919-20 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(adopting similar doctrine without calling it "initial interest confusion" or citing Pegasus Petro-
leum Corp.); Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Products Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1076
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (same); Securacom Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286, 298
(D.N.J. 1997) (same). But see Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d
1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting doctrine in case prior to Pegasus). See generally Rachel Jane
Posner, Manipulative Metatagging, Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439 (2000).
151. Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th
Cir. 1999). The billboard analogy is not perfect. As one court has recognized, correcting an initial
error on the web is easier than correcting one on the highway. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d
309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Moreover, the metatag miscreant misleads non-human search
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Other courts have also held that the use of trademarks in metatags
constitutes infringement in these circumstances.
152
There are still open questions, of course, including disputes
about the extent to which "initial interest confusion" should apply
to sites criticizing the trademark owner. 1 3 And there is a lively de-
bate in the literature about the extent to which metatagging should
be considered a Lanham Act violation at all. 54 But despite the su-
perficial strangeness of the metatag question, courts are success-
fully adapting existing trademark law to this new context. This is
another real world problem resolved in the courts, although the
ACPA was not prescient enough to add anything to the analysis.
Moreover, neither the ACPA nor a hypothetical Anti-Metatag
Act 15 5 are likely to answer the cyberspace trademark questions that
are inevitably just around the corner. The abuse of metatags is not
limited to trademark infringement: some web site owners load up
their metatags with irrelevant but frequently requested words,
such as "sex" (a strategy sometimes called "spamdexing").' 56 Differ-
ent search engines use different strategies to deal with the problem,
engines rather than consumers; some commentators have suggested that that fact should pre-
clude infringement actions. See Nathenson, supra note 145, at 112; Sees, supra note 148, at 115;
Shipman, supra note 148, at 271-74. But see Posner, supra note 150, at 492-97 (arguing that
humans are ultimately confused). Nevertheless, the billboard analogy is sufficiently persuasive
to justify the use of the "initial interest confusion" doctrine in the context of metatags.
152. See, e.g., N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., C.A. No. 97-734-A,
1998 WL 724000 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27
F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp.
1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). But see Nathenson, supra note 145, at 114-22 (criticizing use of initial
interest confusion in metatag cases, but suggesting that metatag abuse constitutes dilution). See
generally Posner, supra note 150.
153. Compare Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), with Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
154. See, e.g., Nathenson, supra note 145, at 59-63 (offering detailed discussion of legitimate
and illegitimate uses of metatags); O'Rourke, supra note 145, at 302-07 (suggesting that many
uses of another's trademark in metatags should not be actionable); Posner, supra note 150, at
505 (praising the Brookfield Communications case and urging other circuits to consider metatag-
ging as trademark infringement); Collins, supra note 141, at 264-67 (criticizing Brookfield Com-
munications case and application of initial interest confusion to Internet); Tom Monagan, Note,
Can an Invisible Word Create Confusion? The Need for Clarity in the Law of Trademark In-
fringement Through Internet Metatags, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 973, 1000-05 (2001) (suggesting that
courts have strayed from basic trademark law and overprotected trademarks in the context of
metatags); Sees, supra note 148, at 112-13 (same); Weaver, supra note 148, at 670.
155. One commentator has proposed that Congress should amend trademark law to deal
with metatag problems. Shipman, supra note 148, at 283-85; cf. Martin, supra note 42, at 607-09
(suggesting Congress should resolve "initial interest confusion" questions).
156. See Deutsch, supra note 145, at 851-52; Nathenson, supra note 145, at 63.
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none of them fully successful as yet. 157 But a technological solution
is probably on the horizon: it is the nature of this fast-developing
technology that almost as fast as one form of cyber-mischief devel-
ops, electronic countermeasures will be found to solve the problem.
It is equally probable, of course, that future cyber-pirates will find
another way to make money off the Internet. By the time Congress
passes a statute designed to deal with a problem, technology is
likely to make the new remedy obsolete. Where the technology is
not quite fast enough to solve the problem, courts, constantly con-
fronting the latest version of cyber-piracy, can tweak existing doc-
trine and adapt. Congress has to go back to the drawing board each
time, something that it is unlikely to do and that will ultimately be
a waste of time.
And metatags are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to
technological innovations. Courts will soon face new copyright and
trademark questions involving framing, hyperlinking, and key-
words, all of which involve methods of getting from one web site to
another without using a domain name. 158 In the context of personal
jurisdiction doctrines, addressed in Part III, courts will have to de-
cide whether "cookies" and "packet-sniffers" are sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction. 159 And if in the meantime Congress has
passed a statute to govern personal jurisdiction on the Internet, I
have no doubt that that statute will be at least as unhelpful in
cookie and packet-sniffer cases as the ACPA has been in cyber-
squatting cases.
157. For a description of some older attempts to get around the problem, see O'Rourke, supra
note 145, at 286-87.
158. See Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82
MINN. L. REV. 609, 634-84 (1998); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the
Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 567-98 (2001); Scott
J. Rubin, The Internet and the Legal Battlegrounds of the Future: From Internet Domain Names
to Internet Keywords, 68 UMKC L. REV. 77, 94-113 (1999).
159. Every time I teach personal jurisdiction in Civil Procedure and tell the students about
the latest cutting edge cyberlaw issues, a tech-savvy student inevitably raises a question that
courts have not yet confronted. Last year it was cookies, which are little information-gathering
bits of data that go from a web site to a visitor's own computer and send information about the
visitor's surfing habits back to the web site owner. Since the consumer doesn't even know about
them, it's hard to characterize them as "interactive," and yet they are certainly not "passive."
This year it was packet-sniffers. Packet-sniffers present even more of a personal jurisdiction
problem than cookies, because they do not have a geographic location at all: they search (or





In the case of cybersquatting, it is not only technology that
has overtaken congressional enactments. Some changes have made
cybersquatting less of a problem in particular cases. For example,
the ongoing development of additional top-level domains (such as
.biz for businesses, .aero for the airline industry, .museum for mu-
seums, and .name for individuals) 160 will make conflict less likely:
the child named Pokey will now be able to register pokey.name
without interfering with the toy maker's desire to own pokey.com.,61
However, the most significant development is the availabil-
ity of an alternative to federal litigation by aggrieved trademark
owners. In November 1999--ironically, the same month that the
ACPA took effect-the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN"), an international nonprofit organization
with overall responsibility for domain names, established its Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP"). Under the
UDRP, any domain name registrant must agree to submit to non-
binding arbitration if its domain name is challenged by a trade-
mark owner.
To prevail under the UDRP, a complaining mark owner must
allege and prove that: "(i) [the registrant's] domain name is identi-
cal or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which
the complainant has rights; and (ii) [the respondent] has no rights
or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) [the]
domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith." 162
The UDRP provides a nonexhaustive list of three factors to deter-
mine whether the registrant has a legitimate interest in the domain
name: (1) that the registrant used the name prior to notice of the
dispute; (2) that the registrant is commonly known by the name; or
(3) that the registrant is making a fair or noncommercial use of the
name. 163 The UDRP contains a further nonexhaustive list of four
factors governing the determination of bad faith: obtaining the do-
main name (1) "for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise
transferring it" for profit; (2) "in order to prevent the owner of the
[mark] from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name";
(3) "for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor"; or
160. See ICANN New TLD Program, at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
161. See supra note 141.
162. ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy § 4(a), available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited July 23, 2000).
163. 1d. § 4(c).
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(4) to "attract, for commercial gain, Internet users ... by creating a
likelihood of confusion ... as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation,
or endorsement of ... the web site."
164
If these elements and factors sound familiar, they should. As
one commentator has noted, the UDRP and the ACPA are "essen-
tially the same law." 16 5 But unlike the hastily enacted ACPA, the
UDRP was several years in the making, and was adopted in re-
sponse to both a U.S. Department of Commerce "White Paper" and
a WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) Report, which
in turn drew on successive drafts with extensive comment peri-
ods. 166 And while the UDRP has been subject to some criticism, 167 it
is apparently much more popular with trademark owners than is
the ACPA: there are only about forty reported ACPA cases, but
there have been over 4,000 arbitrations under the UDRP.
168
The ACPA, then, offers a classic illustration of congressional
regulation in an area that would have been better left to the judici-
ary and the international organization created to deal with exactly
the problems that prompted the ACPA. Trademark owners prefer
164. Id. § 4(b).
165. Donna L. Howard, Trademarks and Service Marks and Internet Domain Names: Giving
ICANN Deference, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637, 657 (2001). For a contrary view, see Jason M. Osborn,
Note, Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes: ICANN's Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act of 1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209, 237-49 (2000) (listing differences between the two
systems).
166. For a history of ICANN and the UDRP, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyber-
space: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 50-93
(2000); Stacey H. King, The "Law That It Deems Applicable" ICANN, Dispute Resolution, and
the Problem of Cybersquatting, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 468-501 (2000); LiRocchi et
al., supra note 24, at 434-42; Christopher J. Schulte, The New Anticybersquatting Law and Uni-
form Dispute Resolution Policy for Domain Names, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 101, 102-05 (2000); see
also Marshall Leaffer, Domain Names, Globalization and Internet Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 139, 139-65 (1998) (reviewing the ongoing problems as of 1998).
167. See, e.g., Robert Badgley, Internet Domain Names and ICANN Arbitration: The Emerg-
ing "Law" of Domain Name Custody Disputes, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 343, 360-68 (2001); Gideon
Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
211, 225-29; Ian L. Stewart, Note, The Best Laid Plans: How Unrestrained Arbitration Decisions
Have Corrupted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 509
(2001); Froomkin, supra note 166; Moreland & Springer, supra note 25, at 389-94; Najarian,
supra note 141, at 134-39; Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain
Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149, 161-65 (2000); Elizabeth G. Thornburg,
Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
151 (2000); Searing, supra note 141, at 134-39; Kaplan, supra note 42, at 80-82. Much of the
criticism charges that the UDRP gives trademark owners too much power. Whether or not that is
true, the ACPA does not protect domain name registrants from bullying by trademark owners,
and thus offers no additional benefit to defendants.
168. See ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited July
23, 2001); see also Badgley, supra note 167, at 348-50.
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the UDRP. The First Amendment and the judicial system are better
served by continuing under the FTDA. The ACPA, on the other
hand, benefits no one: it accomplishes little, and does so at some
cost. Why, then, was it enacted? The next section returns to that
question, raised first in the Introduction.
D. Congress and the Courts
Congress was not unaware of the ACPA's flaws; it was sim-
ply able to ignore them because they were so ephemeral. The legis-
lative history of the ACPA offers a perfect illustration of what hap-
pens when one-sided pressure on Congress overwhelms its ability to
take the long view or to consider intangible interests.
The ACPA was enacted as part of an omnibus appropriations
bill. It was apparently considered so minor, in fact, that it was
passed unanimously by both houses of Congress with little or no
discussion. 16 9 The President did not even mention the anticyber-
squatting portion of the appropriations bill in his signing state-
ment. 170
The only significant discussion of the ACPA occurred in a
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. 171 That hearing
exemplified the arguments against hasty passage of cyber-
legislation. The committee heard from three live witnesses, each of
whom also submitted a written statement. 172 Those witnesses all
represented trademark owners: one was the president of the Inter-
national Trademark Association ("INTA"), another was a lawyer
who represented trademark owners, and the third was the head of a
company that investigated trademark violations on the Internet. All
three stressed that cybersquatting was accelerating, and that it was
confusing consumers and jeopardizing e-commerce. 173 Their unani-
169. See 106 CONG. REc. H10823-31 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1999) (desultory praise but no sub-
stantive discussion); 106 CONG. REC. S10513-20 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (no discussion).
170. See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 3194, Pub. L. 106-
113, 106th Cong. (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 290.
171. The hearing actually considered an earlier version of the ACPA. Several amendments
and substitutions occurred subsequently, but none were accompanied by any substantive discus-
sion.
172. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearings
on S.1255 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999).
173. See, e.g., id. at 6 (statement of Anne H. Chasser, President, International Trademark
Association) ("Cybersquatting is on the rise."); id. at 9 (Chasser) ("INTA believes that the pro-
gress [in e-commercel made thus far, as well as that which is anticipated, will not be truly real-
ized unless there is a legal mechanism in place that specifically addresses cybersquatting."); id.
at 11 (statement of Gregory D. Phillips, Howard, Phillips & Andersen) ("[T]he cost of cybersquat-
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mous opinion was that a federal anticybersquatting law was an
.immediate necessity.
But Congress was not left to ferret out potential problems on
its own. Two law professors, both experts in intellectual property
law, submitted written testimony. Their testimony presaged my
arguments in this Article. Professors Jessica Litman and Michael
Froomkin told Congress that the courts had been consistently rul-
ing against cybersquatters under existing law, that WIPO was de-
veloping mandatory arbitration rules that would solve the problem,
and that the proposed statute jeopardized First Amendment inter-
ests. 174 Froomkin concluded that the bill "will do more harm than
good."1
75
Congress was particularly made aware that the courts were
taking care of the problem. Both professors provided detailed dis-
cussions of the existing case law: Litman stated that "courts have
been merciless to defendants perceived as cybersquatters,"' 176 while
Froomkin noted that "every cybersquatter who has gone to court
has lost."177 The other witnesses could not refute this evidence. In-
stead, when asked about it, they replied that cybersquatting was on
the rise and that cybersquatters were getting smarter and better
able to evade existing trademark law. 78 They provided no support
for either assertion. Moreover, as my survey of the cases suggests,
the courts uniformly dealt harshly with cybersquatters, however
clever. Nevertheless, the Committee unanimously voted the bill out,
and Committee members touted its virtues to the full Senate.
That Congress ignored law professors should come as no
surprise, 179 but there is a lesson here. Litman and Froomkin were
ting and cyberpiracy is enormous."); id. at 16 (Phillips) ("[E]lectronic commerce ... must be pro-
tected from malicious and willful acts of cyberpiracy ....); id. at 45 (statement of Christopher
D. Young, President & Co-Founder, Cyveillance, Inc.) ("Consumers are the real victims ... of
cybersquatters .... ).
174. See id. at 73-79 (statements of Jessica Litman, Professor of Law, Wayne State Univer-
sity, and A. Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law).
175. Id. at 77.
176. Id. at 74.
177. Id. at 77.
178. See, e.g., id. at 8 (Chasser) ("[C]ybersquatters ... have taken the necessary precautions
to insulate themselves from liability."); id. at 11 (Phillips) ("Cyberpirates are sophisticated. They
know how to insulate themselves from legal process."); id. at 61 (Chasser) (stating that "in-
stances of cybersquatting are clearly on the rise" and "[c]ybersquatters are clever").
179. Perhaps some of it is the fault of our profession, for claiming to know too much. See Neal
Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future ofAcademic Freedom,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 165-79 (1999); Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: The Transmis-
sion of Intellectual Capital from the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13, 13-
21 (2001); Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 921, 928-30 (2001).
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representing an abstraction, defending the judicial process and the
First Amendment rather than anyone's concrete interests. The task
fell to experts because these intangible public interests have no
partisans. Congress did not enact this unnecessary law out of igno-
rance, but out of the political circumstances of the latest cyber-
crisis.
And the ACPA is not the only federal statute that creates
more problems than it solves. The next section looks at E-SIGN,
another unnecessary and potentially harmful federal statute gov-
erning cyber-technology. E-SIGN is neither as significant nor as
problematic as the ACPA, but it provides another example of crisis-
induced legislation.
II. WRITING THE FUTURE: E-SIGN
If you are reading this Article online, are you reading a
"writing"? Uncertainty about possible judicial answers to that ques-
tion triggered concern about whether electronic contracts and elec-
tronic "signatures" would be held valid. The statute of frauds and
other laws require certain contracts to be "in writing." Many con-
tracts and other documents must be "signed" to be legally valid. The
new technology used in e-commerce raised questions about the ap-
plication of such requirements to contracts and signatures that
were produced by-and often remained entirely within-the ones
and zeroes of a computer's circuitry.
Courts have dealt with similar problems in the past, as other
new technology supplemented or replaced paper-and-ink contracts.
They have consistently held that telegrams and telexes constitute a
writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds180 and have as-
sumed without deciding that faxes also do so. 18 1 Any collection of
symbols that the sender intends to serve as a signature does so, in-
cluding names on telegrams (communicated orally to an opera-
180. See, e.g., Selma Sav. Bank v. Webster County Bank, 206 S.W. 870 (Ky. Ct. App. 1918);
Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487 (1869). See generally Douglas Robert Morrisson, The Statute of
Frauds Online: Can a Computer Sign a Contract for the Sale of Goods?, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
637, 638 (1992) (collecting cases); John Robinson Thomas, Note, Legal Responses to Commercial
Transactions Employing Novel Communications Media, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1149-52 (1992)
(collecting cases).
181. See, e.g., Bogue v. Sizemore, 608 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Bazak Int'l
Corp. v. Mast Indus., Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633, 638-39 (N.Y. 1989); Am. Multimedia, Inc. v. Dalton
Packaging, Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct. 1989). See generally Thomas, supra note 180, at
1155-60 (collecting cases).
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tor), 8 2 telexes, 8 3 faxes (whether originally handwritten or typed), 8 4
and even simply a printed name and logo on a form.
8 5
Beginning in the late 1980s, courts also held that informa-
tion recorded on a computer disk constitutes a "writing" for various
purposes. 8 6 A few courts have now begun to hold that purely elec-
tronic messages-even if not saved to a disk-are also "writings." In
People v. Perry,8 7 for example, the court held that the electronic
submission of false Medicaid claims was actionable under a statute
penalizing the submission of false written instruments. And in Do-
herty v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, the court upheld as "signed" an
e-mail message that identified itself as "the report of Trooper Tho-
mas Kelley," and contained a statement that "[d]ata entry and
transmission were done by Kelly, Thomas, by or at the direction of
Trooper Thomas Kelley."'
88
Most recently, courts have upheld "clickwrap" agreements:
before downloading software, the user must click a box that indi-
cates his agreement to the terms and conditions specified by the
software provider. Courts have uniformly held that clickwrap con-
tracts satisfy all writing and signature requirements.
1 8 9
182. See, e.g., Selma Say. Bank, 206 S.W. at 870; Hillstrom v. Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466, 468-70
(Mont. 1980); see also McMillian, Ltd. v. Warrior Drilling & Eng. Co., 512 So. 2d 14, 23 (Ala.
1986) (mailgram); Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (same). See
generally Thomas, supra note 180, at 1155-60 (collecting cases).
183. See, e.g., Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 126-29 (S.D. Cal. 1948),
vacated, 89 F. Supp. 962 (1950), reinstated, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1952). See generally Thomas,
supra note 180, at 1152-55 (collecting cases).
184. See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 581 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119-20 (Crim. Ct. 1992).
185. See Kohlmeyer & Co. v. Brown, 192 S.E.2d 400, 404 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
186. See, e.g., Clyburn v. Allstate, 826 F. Supp. 955, 956-57 (D.S.C. 1993); People v. Avila,
770 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Rushton, 626 N.E.2d 1378, 1388 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993).
187. 605 N.Y.S.2d 970 (App. Div. 1993).
188. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANE K. WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE §§
14.05[E], 14-23 to 14-24 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing unpublished opinion in Doherty).
189. See, e.g., In re RealNetworks, Inc. v. Privacy Litig., No. 00C1366, 2000 WL 631341, at
*2-4 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020,
1025 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530-31 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1999); Groffv. Am. Online, Inc., No. PC#97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, at *5-6 (R.I. Super.
Ct. May 27, 1998); cf. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594-95
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that web site "invitation" to view the license agreement, without re-
quirement that user view it or click on agreement, does not constitute a valid clickwrap contract).
There is some dispute about whether "clickwrap" agreements should be enforceable, but
those disputes do not center on the issue of "writing." The same disputes arise when courts con-
sider the question of "shrinkwrap" agreements, which hold the consumer to a contract if he opens
the plastic wrap around a software product. Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1450-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (shrinkwrap contract valid), with Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (shrinkwrap contract not valid). See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual
Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1378-86
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Several commentators have thus concluded that neither a
writing requirement nor a signature requirement is likely to stand
in the way of electronic contracts. 90 Businesses apparently agreed:
the first paperless electronic real estate closing (banking and mort-
gages were previously one of the most paper-bound industries) took
place before any federal legislation on electronic signatures was in
effect. 191
Despite this record of judicial accommodation of new tech-
nology, several state legislatures, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), and, eventually,
Congress, decided that positive legislation was necessary to ensure
that various writing requirements did not stand in the way of e-
commerce. The result is the federal Electronic Signatures in Global
and National Commerce Act ("E-SIGN").
According to one senator, E-SIGN "took three Senate com-
mittees 8 months and thousands of hours."' 92 Unfortunately, E-
SIGN has little to show for all that work. The statute has two pri-
mary provisions. 93 First, no signature or contract may be denied
legal effect solely because it is in electronic form.' 94 Second, any
state statute regulating electronic contracts and signatures is pre-
empted unless it mirrors the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(UETA) recommended by NCCUSL 195 or unless it specifies alterna-
tive, E-SIGN consistent, technology-neutral procedures for the use
(1998) (criticizing ProCD, Inc.); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of
Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 100-01 (1997) (criticizing ProCD, Inc.); Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1255 (1995) (discussing
possibility that shrinkwrap agreements might violate public policy); Charles R. McManis, The
Privatization (or "Shrink-Wrapping") of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 176
(1999) (criticizing shrinkwrap contracts); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Leg-
islated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of
Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 906 (1999) (discussing shrinkwrap contracts).
190. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 188, §§ 14-21 to 14-22; Larry M. Zanger, Electronic
Contracts: Some of the Basics, available at http://www.mbc.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/LMZ-
ElectronicContracts.pdf (last visited July 18, 2001).
191. See Carrie A. O'Brien, Note, E-SIGN: Will the New Law Increase Internet Security Al-
lowing Online Mortgage Lending to Become Routine?, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 523, 530 (2001).
192. 146 CONG. REC. S5216 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
193. The statute also contains various consumer protection provisions, which presumably
could have been enacted as a stand-alone statute if needed. I do not discuss those provisions
except to note how they complicate the preemption question.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1) (2000).
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of electronic records or signatures. 196 For its part, UETA is simi-
lar-although not identical-in primary substantive effect.
97
Like the ACPA, E-SIGN was popular, especially with certain
high-tech and financial industries. Also like the ACPA, however, E-
SIGN seems both unnecessary and unnecessarily complicated. It is
unnecessary because, as described above, courts were well on their
way to reaching the same substantive results under the common
law. Moreover, by the time E-SIGN was enacted, some version of
UETA had been enacted in eighteen states and was under consid-
eration in eleven more. 198 Several more states had enacted laws
that regulated electronic signatures but that were not modeled on
UETA. 199 Thus, even more so than with cyber-piracy, Congress was
acting in an area already adequately dealt with by other institu-
tions.
It is certainly true, as advocates of E-SIGN argued, that not all
state statutes-nor all judicial decisions--governing electronic signa-
tures and contracts were identical. But e-commerce is no different
from other interstate commerce insofar as it faces a welter of incon-
sistent and possibly conflicting regulations. Such is the price of our
federal system; as Justice Brandeis recognized long ago, it has the
compensating advantage of allowing state law experiments that can
be copied by other states if successful. 200 Indeed, in that sense the
state statutes-whether or not modeled on UETA-offer an advan-
tage over E-SIGN: like judicial decisions, individual state laws are
more limited in geographic scope and more likely to be revised if
necessary than are federal statutes.
Perhaps, given time, the courts and the state legislatures
would have settled on a single successful formula for dealing with
electronic signatures. If not, a federal statute enacted at that later
date would have had several advantages over the hastily enacted E-
SIGN. Congress would have had before it a history of state legisla-
tive and judicial responses to the problems of electronic signatures;
this history might have helped to eliminate unsuccessful ap-
196. § 7002(a)(2).
197. For a review of differences between E-SIGN and UETA, see Robert A. Wittie & Jane K.
Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under the Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA,
56 BUS. LAW. 293, 293-336 (2000).
198. See id. at 296.
199. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW. §§ 101-109 (McKinney 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-
201 to 46-3-504 (1998).
200. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.").
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proaches and to identify potential problems. Waiting would also
have allowed e-commerce to develop, both giving free rein to nonleg-
islative solutions and clearly identifying whatever problems re-
mained.
The failure to await developments would not be a serious
problem if E-SIGN itself did not create new legal problems. A stat-
ute that provides little benefit may be acceptable (although think of
those three committees slaving away for eight months for so little
gain!) if the cost is low. But E-SIGN, like the ACPA, seems to create
more problems than it solves. Although there have been no cases to
date, commentators have been quick to point out that the language
of E-SIGN is far from clear.
The preemption provisions are particularly problematic. As
noted earlier, E-SIGN allows state regulation of electronic records
and signatures if a state adopts UETA or if a state adopts a law
that is both technology-neutral and consistent with E-SIGN. As
several commentators have pointed out, however, UETA is not en-
tirely consistent with E-SIGN.201 Presumably, adoption of a "clean"
version of UETA would nevertheless survive preemption analysis,
although thereby reducing the national uniformity that was one
goal of E-SIGN. But what if a state adopts a modified version of
UETA? Would only the parts that are both different from UETA
and inconsistent with E-SIGN be preempted, or would the adoption
of such a modified UETA make all sections fair game for pre-
emption on the grounds of inconsistency with E-SIGN? 20 2
Other questions have also been raised. One of the largest dif-
ferences between E-SIGN and UETA is in the consumer protection
provisions, and there are conflicting suggestions in the legislative
history of E-SIGN about whether a state adoption of UETA would
displace those E-SIGN provisions. 2 3 The requirement of technologi-
cal neutrality leaves open questions about what to do when the au-
thenticity of an electronic signature is called into question. 20 4 The
201. See, e.g., Shea C. Meehan & D. Benjamin Beard, What Hath Congress Wrought: E-
SIGN, the UETA, and the Question of Preemption, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 389 (2001); Wittie & Winn,
supra note 198; Adam R. Smart, Note, E-SIGN Versus State Electronic Signature Laws: The
Electronic Statutory Background, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 485 (2001).
202. Several commentators raise this question and suggest how different state statutes
might be analyzed depending on the answer. See generally Meehan & Beard, supra note 201;
Smart, supra note 201; Wittie & Winn, supra note 197.
203. See Wittie & Winn, supra note 197, at 328-29.
204. See Drew Wintringham, Federal E-SIGN Law Leaves Open Issues, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 16,
2001, at 57; see also O'Brien, supra note 191, at 539-46 (arguing that the real problem with
online banking is not signatures but security and fraud prevention). But see Jane K. Winn, The
Emperor's New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and Internet Commerce,
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federal Office of Thrift Supervision suggested that E-SIGN "has left
some legal issues unresolved and, indeed, may have created new
ones, particularly for online banking. ' 20 5 Another commentator has
said that "E-SIGN raises as many questions as it answers" in the
health care context.
20 6
All in all, E-SIGN, like the ACPA, may do more harm than
good. As one commentator puts it, "At this point it is impossible to
know whether E-Sign [sic] or the UETA will govern any discrete
portion of any given transaction. '" 20 7 That is a far cry from the cer-
tainty and uniformity that E-SIGN was supposed to deliver in order
to promote e-commerce, but it is typical of a statute enacted with-
out adequate attention to the existing landscape. E-SIGN is proba-
bly more benign than the ACPA, but it offers a further example of
the phenomenon of Congress intervening in circumstances that
should make us wary of the consequences.
If E-SIGN and the ACPA represent congressional failures,
the arcane doctrine of personal jurisdiction illustrates the successes
that can be accomplished when judges are left to develop the law
through the common law method. The next section tells that story.
III. A COMMON LAW SUCCESS STORY: PERSONAL
JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
It is hornbook law that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over an unconsenting defendant unless the defendant has sufficient
"minimum contacts" with the forum to make the exercise of juris-
diction consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice."208 Unfortunately, the hornbook-and the clarity of the
law-stops there. Courts continue to struggle, even in non-Internet
cases, with questions about what activity constitutes minimum con-
tacts and what circumstances make the exercise of jurisdiction fair
and just.
The difficulty of determining whether minimum contacts ex-
ist is exacerbated when the primary contact with the forum is a web
site that is accessible to anyone, including residents of the forum
37 IDAHO L. REV. 353 (2001) (arguing that specifying technology would not be effective); Jane K.
Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1177
(1998) (same).
205. 69 U.S.L.W. 2791 (June 26, 2001).
206. 69 U.S.L.W. 2186 (Oct. 3, 2000) (statement of Alan S. Goldberg).
207. Meehan & Beard, supra note 201, at 413.
208. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). This is the test for specific juris-
diction. I discuss general jurisdiction infra note 213 and text accompanying notes 232-36.
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state. 2 9 Doctrines designed for cases involving physical objects sent
into the state or even telephone calls into (or out of) the state are
difficult to translate into an Internet context.210
Supreme Court precedent, muddy as it is, directs courts to
examine whether the defendant has intentionally directed its ac-
tivities toward the forum state or purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of doing business in the forum state.211 In one sense, the
operator of a web site is not directing its activities anywhere except
toward the state in which the operator and the server are lo-
cated-any transmission of information occurs only because a web
surfer in another state "reaches out" for the information. Such a
narrow reading of minimum contacts, however, would allow web-
based companies to conduct business in every state but be amena-
ble to jurisdiction only at home. On the other hand, one can argue
that because a web site owner knows that its site is accessible to
residents of the forum state (as well as of every other state), it has
209. Courts have also faced the question of whether ordinary business dealings-contract
negotiations and the like-transacted by e-mail instead of (or in addition to) by mail or telephone
constitute minimum contacts. Because the Supreme Court held as early as 1985 that a defendant
might transact business in the state through "mail and wire communications" without any
physical presence, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985), the addition of e-
mail has not presented any serious problems for courts. See, e.g., Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43,
45-46 (D. Conn. 1997); Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Group, No. IP96-1457-C-
MIS, 1997 WL 148567, at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997); EDIAS Software Int'l v. BASIS Int'l
Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Boudreau v. Scitex Corp., Civ. A. No. 91-13059-4, 1992 WL
159667, at *3 (D. Mass. June 25, 1992); cf. Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Internet Solutions, Inc., 205
F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that provider of dial-up Internet services, which know-
ingly and wrongfully routed customers through Internet access provider in forum state, was
subject to jurisdiction, and that although initial, inadvertent routing might have been "fortui-
tous," continued routing after learning that its mistake was causing problems for plaintiff in
forum state was intentional).
210. This has led a number of commentators to suggest that existing doctrines should not be
applied to the Internet context. See, e.g., Mark S. Kende, Lost in Cyberspace: The Judiciary's
Distracted Application of Free Speech and Personal Jurisdiction Doctrines to the Internet, 77 OR.
L. REV. 1125 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the
Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS 575 (1998); Richard A.
Rochlin, Cyberspace, International Shoe, and the Changing Context for Personal Jurisdiction, 32
CONN. L. REV. 653 (2000); David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Proposed Limits
on State Jurisdiction over Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95, 112 (1999).
I argue in this section that courts have in fact been successfully applying traditional personal
jurisdiction doctrines to cyberspace. I am not the first to suggest that traditional doctrines of
jurisdiction can be applied in Internet contexts. See Karin Mika & Aaron J. Reber, Internet Ju-
risdictional Issues: Fundamental Fairness in a Virtual World, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1169
(1997); Stein, supra note 97. Since Stein wrote in 1998, the courts have validated his prediction
that cyberspace presents new but "not uniquely problematic" questions. Stein, supra note 97, at
1191.
211. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987); Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 473-75; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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intentionally directed its activities toward the forum state. But
without more, this broad reading of the minimum contacts test
means that any web site owner can be sued anywhere in the United
States. 2
12
A few early cases fueled a fear that application of the Inter-
national Shoe test to the Internet would take the broad approach
and eviscerate all due process limits on personal jurisdiction. 213
Three 1996 cases from different district courts found personal ju-
risdiction on the ground that defendants had established web sites
accessible to residents of the forum states.21 4 As a later court (re-
jecting the analysis) described it:
The courts in these three cases ... chose to exercise personal jurisdiction for simi-
lar reasons, which can be summarized as follows: through their web sites, defen-
dants consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all Internet users,
including those in the forum state, thereby (allegedly) committing trademark in-
212. As one court put it:
On the one hand, it ... troubles me to force corporations that do business over
the Internet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now factor in the potential
costs of defending against litigation in each and every state .... On the other
hand, it is also troublesome to allow those who conduct business on the Web to
insulate themselves against jurisdiction in every state, except in the state (if
any) where they are physically located.
Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D. Mass. 1997).
213. The "minimum contacts" and "substantial justice" test of International Shoe applies only
to cases involving specific jurisdiction, in which the cause of action arises out of the contacts with
the forum state. If the cause of action does not arise out of the contacts with the forum state,
general jurisdiction is required, and can only be exercised if the defendant has had "systematic
and continuous" contacts with the forum state. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 421 (1984). No court has held that merely maintaining a web site accessible in the
forum state is sufficient for general jurisdiction, and several have explicitly held that it is not.
See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); American Eyewear, Inc. v.
Peeper's Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 899 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Molnlycke
Health Care v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Har-
buck v. ARAMCO, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-1971, 1999 WL 999431, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999). 1
therefore discuss only the question of specific jurisdiction, except with regard to interactive web
sites allowing online ordering, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 232-36.
214. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 161, 164 (D. Conn. 1996); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D.
Mass. 1997) (language suggesting web site with e-mail capabilities sufficient for jurisdiction, but
also relying on additional contacts with state); Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, 993 F. Supp.
621, 623 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding jurisdiction on the basis of a passive web site and advertising
in a national magazine); Telco Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va.
1997) (relying on Virginia long-arm statute to hold that operation of passive web site constitutes
regular solicitation of business, and noting in dicta that exercising jurisdiction would not violate
due process). Although the court in Heroes indicated that it was inclined to allow jurisdiction on
the basis of the web site, it did not ultimately rely on that fact alone, as the defendant had also
placed an advertisement in the local newspaper. 958 F. Supp. at 5.
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fringement in the forum state and purposefully availing themselves of the privi-
lege of doing business with the forum state.
21 5
Two state-initiated cases that same year also contributed to specu-
lation that the Internet would massively expand courts' jurisdic-
tion. In United States v. Thomas,216 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of two California defendants for maintaining a web site
that violated the local community standards for obscenity in Mem-
phis, Tennessee; the web site had been accessed by a government
agent in Memphis. In State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,217 in which
the Minnesota Attorney General sought to enjoin an out-of-state
online gambling web site accessible to Minnesota citizens, a state
court also found personal jurisdiction.
But within a year, courts had begun drawing distinctions
that avoided both an overly broad and an overly narrow reading of
International Shoe in the cyberspace context. The first-and still
most influential--case to do so was Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.218 In Zippo, the court suggested that whether a
web site accessible in the forum state conferred jurisdiction de-
pended on "the nature and quality of commercial activity that an
215. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 CIV. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997).
216. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). For critiques of this case, see William S. Byassee, Jurisdic-
tion of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 197, 203-16 (1995); Erik G. Swenson, Comment, Redefining Community Standards in
Light of the Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet: A Critique of United States v. Thomas, 82
MINN. L. REV. 855, 870-81 (1998); see also JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS,
AND CYBERSPACE 1-40 (1996) (general discussion of the case).
217. No. C6-95-727, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), af/'d, 568 N.W.2d 715
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd by an equally divided court, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998). For a
critique of this case on traditional jurisdictional principles, see Stein, supra note 97, at 1188-89.
218. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) ("Zippo"). Courts that have explicitly followed Zippo
include Mink, 190 F.3d at 333; Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997);
Multi-Tec Systems, Inc. v. Vocaltec Communications, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (D. Minn. 2000);
Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 724 (W.D. Mich. 2000); McRae's, Inc. v.
Hussain, 105 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 97 F. Supp.
2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam's Army Navy Outfit-
ters-Manhattan, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 919 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate &
Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d
714 (E.D. Va. 2000); Neato Inc. v. Great Gizmos, No. 3:99CV958, 2000 WL 305949 (D. Conn. Feb.
24, 2000); Harbuck v. ARAMCO, Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-1971, 1999 WL 999431 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,
1999); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999); Atlantech Distrib.,
Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D. Md. 1998); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp.,
21 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 1998); SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Invs., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D.
Kan. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997); see also Remick v. Manfredy,
238 F.3d 248, 259 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (approving district court's adoption of Zippo). As discussed
in text, other courts have adopted a similar approach without following Zippo in particular.
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entity conducts over the Internet. 219 The court went on to identify
three categories of web sites:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business
over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files
over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situa-
tions where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site
which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does
little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host com-
puter. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the
level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Web site.
220
Since Zippo, courts have uniformly agreed that merely main-
taining a passive web site is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 2
21
To do otherwise, as many courts have recognized, would be to make
the establishment of a web site tantamount to consenting to juris-
diction in every state. 222 Moreover, as one commentator pointed out
as early as 1998, finding jurisdiction on the basis of a purely pas-
219. 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. See, e.g., Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir.
1999); Mink, 190 F.3d at 336; Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 414; Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126
F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 865-
66 (E.D. Va. 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000); Sports Auth.
Mich., Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Mich. 2000); N. Lights Tech., Inc. v. N.
Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 106 (D. Mass. 2000), af'd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001); Euromar-
ket Designs, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 836; Perry v. righton.com, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1140 (D. Or.
2000); Cello Holdings v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Bailey v.
Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795-96 (W.D. Tenn. 2000); Ty, Inc. v. Clark, No.
99C5532, 2000 WL 51816, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2000); Harbuck v. ARAMCO, Inc., No. CIV.
A. 99-1971, 1999 WL 999431 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999); Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity
Group, LLC, 84 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (S.D. Ohio 1999); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine
Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (explicitly rejecting early cases as
overly broad); Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 685-86 (E.D. Va. 1999); Fix
My PC, L.L.C., v. N.F.N. Assocs., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Barrett v. Catacombs
Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1999); PurCo Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Towers, 38 F. Supp. 2d
1320, 1324 (D. Utah 1999); Millennium Enters. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921
(D. Or. 1999); No Mayo-S.F. v. Memminger, No. 98-C-1392, 1998 WL 544974 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
20, 1998); Bush v. Tidewater Marine Alaska, Inc., No. 1:97CV656, 1998 WL 560048 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 16, 1998); SF Hotel Co., 985 F. Supp. at 1032; McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1828 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
222. See, e.g., GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 420; Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d
696, 700 (D. Md. 2001); Search Force, Inc. v. Dataforce Int'l, 112 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778 n.14 (S.D.
Ind. 2000) (also explicitly rejecting early cases as overly broad); Bailey, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 796;
Millennium Enters., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 923; IDS Life Ins. Co v. SunAm., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258,
1268 (N.D. Ill. 1997), partially rev'd on other grounds, 136 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 1998); Hearst Corp.
v. Goldberger, No. 96 CIV. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
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sive web site is inconsistent with current doctrines of personal ju-
risdiction, which require that the defendant "have consciously cho-
sen to take advantage of a state's privileges and benefits."
223
The Zippo analysis also avoids the opposite extreme, and
thus prevents companies from doing a nationwide business on the
web and nevertheless escaping jurisdiction in any state. Zippo itself
involved a company that operated a web-based news service for
subscribers. It had contracts with seven Internet access providers
in the forum state and 3,000 individuals in the forum state. Each
individual subscriber had submitted an application to the defen-
dant containing his or her address, and, knowing that it was selling
its service to a forum resident, the defendant had entered into the
contract. Despite the fact that the defendant had no other contacts
with the forum state, the court held that it had jurisdiction.
224
Any other ruling would have taken an overly narrow ap-
proach to minimum contacts, allowing the differences between real-
ity and virtual reality to provide a loophole from liability. One in-
genious defendant, for example, suggested that although it entered
into a contract with Virginia plaintiffs (after meeting them face to
face in Virginia), and the plaintiffs performed the contracted work
while sitting in front of computer screens in Virginia, there was no
jurisdiction in Virginia because the work was actually "performed"
in cyberspace. The court responded:
Although the defendants appear to be correct in their contention that much of the
activity in this matter occurred in cyberspace, this can not signify that the increas-
ingly large number of those who deal in e-commerce shall not be subject to juris-
diction in any earthly court. There being no District Court of Cyberspace....
[diefendants will have to settle begrudgingly for the Western District of Vir-
ginia.
225
Until there is a District Court of Cyberspace, then, courts faced
with the two ends of the Zippo spectrum seem to have successfully
adapted the jurisdiction doctrines of real space into the world of
cyberspace.
223. Redish, supra note 210, at 589.
224. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26; see also Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. casinoali-
talia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001) (online casino gambling business); Colt Studio,
Inc. v. Badpuppy Enter., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (subscription business for viewing
online pornography); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (online
casino gambling business).
225. Designs88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik Prods., 133 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (W.D. Va. 2001) (cita-
tions omitted). One very early commentator actually suggested establishing a United States
District Court for the District of Cyberspace, patterned on the United States Court for China.
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 100 (1996).
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The hard cases, of course, lie in the middle of the spectrum.
Even here, however, courts have reached results that are, by and
large, both arguably correct and increasingly predictable. 226 Indeed,
given the confusion that reigns in this area in non-Internet cases,
the Internet cases are remarkably orderly. These intermediate
cases can be divided into three categories and generally reach con-
sistent results within each category.
1. Minimally interactive web sites. In some cases, the web
site is interactive only to the extent that it allows the user to send
e-mail--or other simple replies-back to the web site owner. Cus-
tomers cannot place orders or otherwise do business over the web.
Courts have uniformly found that such minimally interactive sites
cannot, by themselves, provide sufficient contacts for the exercise of
jurisdiction.
227
Although language in some cases might suggest that mini-
mally interactive sites can create jurisdiction, an examination of
the cases themselves indicates that the web sites at issue were in
fact more than minimally interactive. For example, in Thompson v.
Handa-Lopez, Inc., the court focused on the fact that Texas resi-
dents could access the site, and it cited one of the three early per-
sonal jurisdiction cases that allowed jurisdiction on the basis of a
226. Several commentators have suggested that the line-drawing problems generated by in-
termediately interactive web sites make the Zippo approach unworkable. See, e.g., Susan Nauss
Exon, A New Shoe Is Needed to Walk Through Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH
1 (2000); Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdic-
tion, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2001). I argue in text that courts have already begun
to use the common law process to modify Zippo as necessary; whether this is a continuation of
Zippo or a "new" doctrine is beside the point.
227. See, e.g, Mink v. AAAA Dev., 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (e-mail link); ALS Scan,
Inc. v. Wilkins, 142 F. Supp. 2d 703, 709 (D. Md. 2001) (applicant can use web site to "obtain
information about job opportunities"); Am. Info. Corp v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d
696, 702 (D. Md. 2001) (e-mail link including ability to submit resume for employment); S.
Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (e-mail
link, ability to print but not submit lease application, online order form for promotional video);
Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 636, 639 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (e-mail
link); Agar Corp. v. Multi-Fluid, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (web site but-
tons allow "feedback" and "registration"); see also Winfield Collection Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 746, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that sales to forum state through online auction
house e-Bay insufficient to create jurisdiction because seller has no control about where highest
bidder will come from); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(holding that posting to USENET group equivalent to passive web site because poster has no
control about where message will go); Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharms., Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 265, 273 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that posting to USENET group equivalent to passive web
site); Rollin v. Frankel, 996 P.2d 1254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that posting of stock prices
on NASDAQ computer network, available to NASDAQ members anywhere, not sufficient con-
tacts for jurisdiction).
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purely passive web site.228 But the web site involved in Handa-
Lopez was an online casino; customers had to purchase online gam-
ing chips with a credit card before playing, and the web site "con-
tinuously interacted with the casino players, entering into contracts
with them as they played the various games."229 I have found no
cases-after the 1996 trio-in which a court exercised personal ju-
risdiction solely on the basis that the defendant maintained a
minimally interactive web site.
Perhaps the most difficult case to date is GTE New Media
Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.230 In that case, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants had conspired to monopolize the online busi-
ness directory service by breaking the nation into regions to be
served exclusively by each defendant and inducing Internet browser
sites (such as Yahoo and Netscape) to link only to the authorized
member of the conspiracy. Plaintiff alleged that the purpose of the
conspiracy was to divert advertising business from plaintiffs web
site to defendants'. Defendants' only contact with the forum (the
District of Columbia) was that its web site could be accessed by fo-
rum residents. Although the site was interactive, the customer paid
nothing to use defendants' search tools and entered into no transac-
tions with defendants. The district court found jurisdiction on the
basis of presumed effects in the forum, but the D.C. Circuit re-
versed.
As a formal matter, the site was highly interactive, trans-
mitting information back and forth between a defendant's server
and the consumer's computer. The court of appeals, however, ap-
propriately refused to rely on such a wooden interpretation of the
passive/interactive distinction. Since there was no commercial
transaction occurring between the consumer and the defendants,
the court held that the company was not transacting business in
the forum. 23 1 While this is a close case-the defendants were bene-
228. 998 F. Supp. at 743.
229. Id. at 741 (gaming chip purchase), 744 (quotation); see also Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Comput-
ing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 45 (D. Mass 1997) (suggesting that jurisdiction appropriate because
defendant advertised on its web site and "did nothing to avoid" the forum state, but actually
relying on additional, non-Internet contacts with the forum state, and finding that company also
advertised itself as a "virtual company," willing to do business anywhere).
230. 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
231. The court also necessarily rejected a broad view of the "effects test" and failed to accord
a strong presumption of truth to plaintiffs' allegations in a jurisdictional dispute. It is certainly
possible to conclude, contrary to the court's ruling, that plaintiffs' allegations of a conspiracy
intended to cause harm to plaintiff should have satisfied due process concerns under Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). See supra discussion at text accompanying notes 97-98. Whether the
court should have found jurisdiction using the "effects test," however, has nothing to do with the
[Vol. 55:309
HASTE MAKES WASTE
fitting commercially from a web site accessible to, and evidently
accessed by, forum residents-it is not clearly wrong (and may well
be right). Moreover, if the case is ultimately found unpersuasive, it
is unlikely to be followed by other circuits. GTE New Media Ser-
vices thus illustrates one of the strengths of the common law
method: the most important aspect of the case is the court's sensi-
tivity to factual context in its refusal to apply the pas-
sive/interactive distinction in a formalistic manner.
2. Web sites that allow online ordering. In these cases, cus-
tomers can place an order online (paying for it by providing a credit
card number); the order is filled by the web site owner without any
further communication. Many companies now have online ordering,
including both e-businesses like amazon.com and traditional bricks-
and-mortar companies that also do a significant amount of off-line
sales. The few cases involving true e-businesses have all found
them to fall in Zippo's first category, easily holding that jurisdiction
exists. 232 But where a bricks-and-mortar company also allows online
ordering, the issue is more difficult. Online ordering capability is
similar to a passive web site insofar as the site owner has no control
over who has access to the site, but it differs from a passive web
site to the extent that a transaction can be consummated online.
Courts have recognized both the similarities and the differ-
ences between passive web sites and sites allowing online ordering.
Whether a court will find jurisdiction over a web site owner on the
basis of an interactive site that allows online ordering depends on
two factors: (1) is specific or general jurisdiction sought; and (2)
were there any sales in the forum state?
Specific jurisdiction, which requires only minimum contacts
and fairness, is appropriate only where the cause of action arises
out of the contacts. For a court to exercise general jurisdiction, on
the other hand, the cause of action may be unrelated to the con-
tacts, but the contacts themselves need to be "systematic and con-
unique problems of cyberspace: the reach of the "effects test" is uncertain in real space as well as
cyberspace. See infra note 242. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit remanded for further discovery on the
question of whether there were "substantial effects" in the forum. GTE New Media Servs., Inc.,
199 F.3d at 1351-52.
232. See cases cited supra note 224. The one exception might be E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent
Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997). In that case (which did not cite Zippo at all), defendants
operated an Internet business which sold photographic images on the web. Consumers visiting
E-Data's web site entered credit card information and could then download the images they were
viewing. The court held it had no jurisdiction over the defendant in a patent infringement suit
because there was no evidence that any forum residents had visited the site or downloaded any
photographs. The case may be distinguishable because the court relied only on the Connecticut
long-arm statute, not the Due Process Clause. If not, it is an early aberration.
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tinuous" rather than simply minimal. 233 Thus, a company that ships
products into a state-but otherwise has no contacts-is likely to be
amenable to personal jurisdiction in that state for suits arising out
of the products (specific jurisdiction), but not for suits arising out
of, for example, employment contracts or other matters (general
jurisdiction).
While courts have applied the Zippo analysis to both specific
and general jurisdiction, they have been much more reluctant to
base general jurisdiction on Internet activity, even in cases involv-
ing interactive web sites. Courts have generally found that bricks-
and-mortar companies that maintain web sites allowing online or-
dering do not become subject to the general jurisdiction of a forum
state simply on the basis of the web site. For example, in Dagesse v.
Plant Hotel,234 the plaintiffs made their hotel reservations online
and were injured while staying at the hotel. Because the cause of
action did not arise out of the web site, specific jurisdiction was not
appropriate. The court found insufficient contacts for general juris-
diction in the absence of any evidence that the web site generated
significant sales in the forum state. Dagesse is typical: one court
commented in 1999 that plaintiff could not cite any cases in which
general jurisdiction was premised on a web site alone. 235 Where
courts have found general jurisdiction, the defendant has had other,
non-Internet contacts with the forum state in addition to the inter-
active web site. 236
In most of the cases involving interactive web sites, plaintiffs
allege specific rather than general jurisdiction. Courts must then
confront the question whether the maintenance of a fully-
interactive site (one allowing online ordering), accessible to resi-
dents of the forum state, satisfies the minimum contacts test. In
233. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
234. 113 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.N.H. 2000).
235. MoInlycke Health Care v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods., Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452 n.3
(E.D. Pa. 1999); see also Am. Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F.
Supp. 2d 895 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding no general jurisdiction on basis of interactive web site);
Tel. Audio Prods., Inc. v. Smith, No. CIV. A. 3:97-CV-0P63-P, 1998 WL 159932 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
26, 1998) (finding no general jurisdiction on basis of web site plus other contacts); Riviera Oper-
ating Corp. v. Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (same). But see Decker v. Circus Cir-
cus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999) (finding that general jurisdiction would exist on basis
of online reservations capability, but choice of forum clause on web site precludes jurisdiction).
236. See, e.g., Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 785 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (defendant
shipped almost $6 million worth of products into forum state); see also Coastal Video Communi-
cations Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 572 (E.D. Va. 1999) (refusing to find general
jurisdiction on the basis of online ordering web site only, and directing more discovery to deter-
mine non-Internet contacts).
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fact, courts have easily sorted these cases by asking whether the
interactive web site generated any business in the forum state. If it
did not, courts hold that jurisdiction is lacking because-like the
operators of purely passive web sites-the web site owners have not
taken any " 'deliberate action' within the forum state in the form of
transactions between the defendants and residents of the forum."
237
A fully interactive web site that generates sales in the forum state,
however, is enough to satisfy the minimum contacts test, because in
that case the defendant is actually knowingly doing business with
residents of the forum state. 238 An interactive web site that gener-
ates sales in the forum state is thus very similar to taking tele-
phone or mail orders and shipping products into the forum state,
which traditionally gives rise to specific jurisdiction. 239 Any com-
pany that wishes to avoid jurisdiction in a particular forum can
simply refuse to fill orders-whether received by telephone or
through the Internet-from that jurisdiction. 240
3. Web site plus other contacts. As they do outside of the cy-
berspace context, courts often consider multiple contacts with the
forum state. Whether an interactive web site plus additional con-
tacts are sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction raises no
237. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 921 (D. Or. 1999); see
also Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. Mich. 2000); People Solu-
tions, Inc. v. People Solutions, Inc., No. Civ. A. 399-CV-2339-L, 2000 WL 1030619 (N.D. Tex. July
25, 2000); Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group, 84 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909 (S.D. Ohio
1999); Origin Instruments Corp. v. Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 397LV2595-L,
1999 WL 76794 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1999).
238. See, e.g., Am. Eyewear, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 901; Standard Knitting, Ltd. v. Outside
Design, Inc., No. 00-2288, 2000 WL 804434 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2000); Stomp, Inc. v. Neato, 61 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Park Inns Int'l v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
762, 765 (D. Ariz. 1998); Gary Scott Int'l v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass. 1997); Digi-
tal Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); see also Am. Network,
Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that
passive web site plus New York subscribers sufficient for jurisdiction).
239. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Giotis v. Apollo of the Ozarks, 800 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1986); Vence-
dor Mfg. Co. v. Gougler Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1977); Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co.,
304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962); Zorn v. Fingerhut Corp., 1989 WL 143839 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 1989).
240. Currently, for example, states have different regulations regarding the private importa-
tion of wine. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-402 (Supp. 2001) (private importation prohib-
ited), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.417(a) (West Supp. 2002) (private importation of up to two
cases per year permitted). That has not prevented vineyards from establishing interactive web
sites that allow online ordering. Some sites post a list of states to which they will ship. See, e.g.,
http://www.robertmondavi.com/WheretoBuy/index.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2002). Others wait
until the consumer has filled in an order form; if the consumer lists an address in a state that
prohibits importation, the site displays a page informing the consumer that the winery is not
allowed to ship there. See, e.g., http://www.ravenswood-wine.com/how-to-get.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2002). Technology may make it possible to identify the user's place of residence even
more quickly. See Geist, supra note 226.
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new questions. Just as courts are divided on whether advertising in
national print and broadcast media constitutes minimum contacts,
courts have divided on whether a web site plus national advertising
constitutes minimum contacts. 241 Courts also disagree about the
reach of the "effects test": the extent to which an intentional tort
committed outside the state, with effects foreseeably felt within the
forum state, confers jurisdiction without any further "entry" into
the state by the defendant. 42 Since such cases might involve either
a tort committed via the Internet (as in an infringing domain name)
or an "entry" via a web site, the dispute in real space spills over
into the cyberspace context. 243 The resolution of the jurisdictional
241. Compare IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAm., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268-70 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(finding that web site plus national print and broadcast advertising plus toll-free number does
not create jurisdiction), with Haelan Prods. Inc. v. Beso Biological Research Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1672, 1675 (E.D. La. 1997) (finding that web site plus national advertising plus toll-free
number does create jurisdiction), and Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, 993 F. Supp. 621, 623
(N.D. Ohio 1997) (same). The same dispute existed with regard to national advertising before the
advent of the Internet. Compare Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir.
1988) (finding that national advertising available in forum insufficient), with McFaddin v. Nat'l
Executive Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166, 1170-71 (D. Conn. 1973) (national advertising avail-
able in forum sufficient), and Siskind v. Villa Found. for Educ., 642 SW.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1982)
(same).
Both Haelan Products and Zupanc, moreover, were relatively early cases; no cases since then
have upheld personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of a passive web site, national advertising,
and a toll-free number. The vast majority of courts hold that national advertising-whether in
traditional media or on the web-is insufficient by itself to create personal jurisdiction. Robert
M. Harkins, Jr., The Legal World Wide Web: Electronic Personal Jurisdiction in Commercial
Litigation, or How to Expose Yourself to Liability Anywhere in the World with the Press of a But-
ton, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 451, 483-84 n.210 (1997) (listing cases holding that national advertising in
traditional media insufficient); see supra note 221 (passive web advertising insufficient).
242. For non-Internet cases adopting a broad reading of the Calder effects test, see, for ex-
ample, Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865 (5th Cir. 2001); Jan-
mark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997); Gordy v. Daily News, 95 F.3d 829 (9th
Cir. 1996); Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1992); Dakota Indus. Inc.
v. Dakota Sportswear, 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1991); Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 1989); Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1989);
Burt v. Bd. of Regents, 757 F.2d 242, 244-46 (10th Cir. 1985). For non-Internet cases adopting a
narrow reading, see, for example, IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998); Far
West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995); Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic
Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nylon Eng'g Resins, Inc., 896 F.
Supp. 1190 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Green v. USF & G Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
One scholar has suggested that the "effects test" is problematic largely because it is inconsis-
tent with the rest of personal jurisdiction doctrine. See Redish, supra note 210, at 596-98.
243. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.
2000) (finding that sending threatening letter to plaintiff in dispute over domain name sufficient
for jurisdiction under "effects test"); Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795-97
(W.D. Tenn. 2000) (finding that allegedly defamatory statements on web site do not satisfy "ef-
fects test" because comments had nothing to do with plaintiffs status as a local businessman but
rather as a national commentator and salesman); Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692,
702 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that defamation by posting to a USENET group sufficient for juris-
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questions in these sorts of cases, however, does not depend on any
determination that is unique to cyberspace.
244
By attuning personal jurisdiction analysis to how the web
site is being used, then, courts have managed to make sense of the
different factual contexts. The Zippo framework, supplemented by
the categories of interactive web sites, provides a predictable guide
to personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. It also avoids both jurisdic-
tional overreaching and jurisdictional timidity. I do not contend
that the exact balance reached by the courts is immune from criti-
cism, nor that Zippo and its progeny offer a perfect answer any
more than International Shoe and its progeny offer the perfect
analysis of jurisdiction in real space. 245 I do argue, however, that
the results are both generally defensible and, equally important,
predictable, and that in that sense the courts have successfully
adapted traditional doctrines to the new technology.
Early on, it seemed that courts would never reach this point.
Surveying the cases on personal jurisdiction and cyberspace in
1998, one commentator declared that "the current hodgepodge of
diction under the "effects test"); Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Serv. Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1375, 1377 (C.D. 111. 1998) (holding that because requirement of "entry," if it exists at all,
is so low, even largely passive web site satisfies it); EDIAS Software Int'l v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947
F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ariz. 1996) (holding that defamatory statements on web page satisfied
"effects test"); Cal. Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (holding that defamation by posting to a USENET group was sufficient for jurisdiction
under the "effects test"); see also cases cited supra notes 97-98. See generally Exon, supra note
226, at 34-42 (examining "effects test" cases).
For a critique of the "effects test," see Geist, supra note 226. Geist argues that the "effects
test" has replaced the Zippo test, suggesting that the problem is unique to cyberspace. But, as
noted supra note 242, courts have also struggled with "effects test" questions outside of the
Internet context.
244. As one court has noted, there is also a dispute about whether the additional, non-
Internet contacts must be related to the cause of action or to the web site. See Millennium En-
ters. v. Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 918 (D. Or. 1999). The extent to which all of the
contacts must be related to the cause of action, however, is a question that arises in both cyber-
space and real space cases, and the confusion cannot be attributed to the need to translate exist-
ing doctrine into cyberspace. See generally Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 77 (discussing related and unrelated
contacts).
245. For a few of the many critiques and suggestions of other tests for personal jurisdiction,
in and out of cyberspace, see, for example, Geist, supra note 226 (cyberspace); Kevin C. McMuni-
gal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction,
108 YALE L.J. 189 (1998) (real space); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Bee-
tle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529 (1991) (real space); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federal-
ism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981) (real
space); Redish, supra note 210 (cyberspace and real space); Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the
Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1998) (cyber-
space and real space); Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (1995) (real space).
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case law is inconsistent, irrational, and irreconcilable. 246 Four
years later, however, the courts have made great progress. In most
cases, defendants with web sites can predict in advance whether
their web sites will subject them to personal jurisdiction in other
states. There are relatively clear lines between passive (or nearly
passive) web sites, interactive web sites maintained by bricks-and-
mortar businesses, and e-businesses. Moreover, courts have mostly
adopted the requirement that interactive sites be accompanied by
sales to the forum state. One might even argue that the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction in cyberspace is more consistent and rational
than the law of personal jurisdiction in real space. It is at least in
no more disarray than its non-Internet counterpart. 24 7
After some early missteps, then, courts used traditional legal
tools to solve the new questions raised by virtual reality. As one
court noted in 1999, the context was new but the problems were
not: "[T]he dilemma this Court faces today is not much different
than the dilemma courts faced 50 years ago when the application of
a then rigid personal jurisdiction standard was at odds with what
was then considered a recent trend in the way companies did busi-
ness: interstate commerce." 248 Congress did not step in at either
point,249 and the courts quickly adapted existing doctrines to new
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The computer hardware and software with which I write this
Article will become obsolete within a year, perhaps less. The tech-
nological circumstances discussed in this Article will change even
246. Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More Is Required
on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 939 (1998); see also Todd D. Leit-
stein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565, 565 (1999) ("Pre-
dictable internet jurisdiction is becoming an oxymoron."); Wille, supra note 210, at 110 ("Uncer-
tainty reigns.").
247. One court likened personal jurisdiction to Winston Churchill's description of the Soviet
Union: "[A] riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." Donatelli v. NHL, 893 F.2d 459, 462
(lst Cir. 1990). A scholar commented, with wry understatement, that jurisdictional doctrines
"have not necessarily produced recognizably coherent results when applied to real-space activ-
ity," and "[a] comprehensive theory of personal jurisdiction has largely eluded commentators."
Burk, Federalism, supra note 20, at 1109.
248. Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy Enters., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
249. Inevitably, commentators suggested that Congress should do so. See David Thatch, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and the World-Wide Web: Bits (and Bytes) of Minimum Contacts, 23 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 143, 163 (1997); Nicholas R. Spampata, Note, King Pennoyer Dethroned.
A Policy-Analysis-Influenced Study of the Limits of Pennoyer v. Neff in the Jurisdictional Envi-
ronment of the Internet, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1742, 1773-74 (2000).
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more quickly. Given law review publication schedules, then, the
Article you have just read is already hopelessly out of date. Its dis-
cussion of ACPA, E-SIGN, and personal jurisdiction will become, at
best, an historically useful compilation and a starting place-a
shortcut into the literature-for future research.
But my hope is that the larger lesson will remain. I have
tried to describe circumstances under which Congress is apt to
make mistakes, and to identify cyberlaw as a prominent example.
The particular topics and statutes this Article explores are only il-
lustrations of the potential mischief that overly hasty legislation
can create. If Congress erred in enacting the ACPA and E-SIGN,
what about its response to the next cyber-crisis? My thesis here is
that we should give the common law process time to address what-
ever technologically induced crisis is brewing at the time you hap-
pen to read this Article. I cannot predict what that crisis will be,
but I am confident that one will arise. And I am also confident that
an immediate congressional response will most likely be worse than
any response provided by the common law process.
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